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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-2-2.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
In their opening brief, Plaintiffs/Appellants ( ; The Prunedas") present seven issues
on appeal. Defendants/Appellees ("Columbia Steel") contend that these seven issues
may be properly distilled down to the following five issues:
1. Whether the invited error doctrine precludes a party from challenging a jury
instruction or special verdict form where that the same party drafted and approved
the instruction and verdict form, only raising objection to either after the jury
returned its verdict.
2. Whether a person injured in a car accident is entitled to recover an award of
general damages that is "substantial/' rather than nominal, where that person has
received an award of special damages in excess of the statutorily mandated $3,000
personal injury protection threshold.
3. Whether the trial court acted within its broad discretion by excluding the injured
party's treating physician's expert testimony regarding causation of injuries where
the physician was not designated to give such testimony and where the physician
did not provide an expert report setting forth his qualifications to testify beyond
matters of care and treatment or his opinion on such matters.
4. Whether the trial court acted within its broad discretion by allowing Dr. France, an
accident reconstructionist and biomechanical engineer, to testify at trial as an

expert witness where Dr. France relied on materials commonly used by experts in
the accident reconstruction field.
5. Whether the trial court acted within its broad discretion when it allowed Dr.
Clarke, a medical doctor, to testify at trial as an expert witness with regard to the
appropriateness of care provided by a chiropractor.

RELEVANT STATUTES & RULES
Utah Code Section 31A-22-309(l)(a):
(1) (a) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a policy
which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of action for general
damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile
accident, except where the person has sustained one or more of the following:
(i) death;
(ii) dismemberment;
(iii) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings;
(iv) permanent disfigurement; or
(v) medical expenses to a person in excess of $ 3,000.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3)(B)
(3) Disclosure of expert testimony . . .
(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure
shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve
giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the
witness or party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is
expected to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected
to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness,
including a list of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years;
the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases
in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the
preceding four years.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
The Prunedas brought suit against Columbia Steel and Richard Gray to recover for
injuries incurred in an automobile accident. (R. 1-3.)
B. Course of the Proceedings
This case went to trial before a jury in April 2006. (R. 773-775.) Prior to trial, the
Prunedas moved to exclude the testimony of Columbia Steel's two designated experts:
accident reconstructionist Dr. Paul France ("Dr. France") and physiatrist Dr. Jayne Clark
("Dr. Clark"). (R. 114-203.) Columbia Steel also moved to exclude the Prunedas'
treating physician, chiropractor Dr. Gordon McLean ('Dr. McLean"), prior to trial. (R.
497-502.)
After the trial, the jury found the Columbia Steel liable for the Prunedas' injuries
and awarded $6,083.07 in damages. (R. 699-703.) This damage award included no
award for general damages, but an award of special damages for each of the Prunedas as
follows: $4,763.07 for Sergio Pruneda Sr., $220.00 for Anthony Guerrero, $220.00 for
Donovan Guerrero, $220.00 for Sergio Pruneda, Jr., $220.00 for Cozy Pruneda, $220.00
for Matthew Pruneda, and $220.00 for Zennia Pruneda. Id After the jury's special
verdict form was read, the Prunedas objected to the jury instructions on damages and the
special verdict form. (R. 775 at 284:8-290:12.)
C Disposition of the Trial Court
The court denied the Prunedas' motions to exclude Dr. France and Dr. Clark. R.
464-465.) The court granted Columbia Steel's motion regarding the Prunedas* treating

physician, Dr. McLean, in part and denied it in part. In its ruling, the court excluded the
treating physician's testimony relating to causation, but allowed his testimony regarding
care and treatment. (R. 773 at 40:5-7.) The court also overruled the Prunedas' objections
to the jury instructions on damages and the special verdict form on the grounds that the
Prunedas had waived their right to challenge the jury instruction and special verdict
because the Prunedas themselves had proposed the jury instruction on damage that was
incorporated into the special verdict form and subsequently failed to raise the issue of its
potential error at a time prior to the jury returning its verdict. (R. 775 at 284:8-290:12.)
D, Statement of the Facts
The Accident
On July 31, 2002, the Prunedas, Richard Gray of Columbia Steel, and Victor Perez
were involved in a low-impact rear-end collision. (R. 774 at 247:22-24; R. 774 at 8:1519.) The incident began while the three vehicles waited at a stop light at an intersection
in Pleasant Grove, Utah, Mr. Gray's vehicle being behind Mr. Pruneda's Chrysler
LeBaron, which was behind Mr. Perez's Chevrolet Nova. (R. 775 at 155:7-12; R. 774 at
11:12-25.) The light turned green and the three cars began to move forward until Mr.
Perez's Nova, the first car of the three, suddenly stalled in the middle of the intersection.
(R. 775 at 156:5-8; R. 774 at 248:21-24.) Although Mr. Pruneda managed to stop his
LeBaron before touching the Nova in front of him, Mr. Gray was not able to stop his
vehicle before it made contact with the Prunedas' LeBaron. (R. 774 at 12:4-22.) Mr.
Gray's contact with the Prunedas' LeBaron pushed it forward where it then made contact
with the rear of Mr. Perez's Nova. (R. 774 at 12:19-13:4; 774 at 249:1.)
4

The cars involved in this collision moved only short distances and made impact at
low speeds. From his stationary position during the red light, Mr. Gray traveled a little
over one car length before coming into contact with the Prunedas' LeBaron. (R. 775 at
156:9-17.) In that time his vehicle only accelerated a small amount and made impact
with the Prunedas' LeBaron while traveling at approximately nine to twelve miles per
hour. (R. 774 at 133:12-15.) The Prunedas' LeBaron, on the other hand, only moved
forward approximately one car length, eight to ten feet, before it made contact with Mr.
Perez's Nova and it was only traveling approximately seven to nine miles per hour when
it made impact with the Nova. (R. 774 at 133:18-20; R. 774 at 182:4-7; R. 774 at 191:37.) The push from the Prunedas5 LeBaron caused the Nova toicoast[] off to the side of the
road," before it came to a rest near the curb. (R. 774 at 249:1-3.)
Not surprisingly, this low-impact collision resulted in little damage to each of the
vehicles. The Dodge Durango driven by Mr. Gray showed little damage, only three small
dents to the front bumper. (R. 774 at 179:12-14; R. 775: 161:6-9.) The LeBaron driven
by Mr. Pruneda had damage to the rear bumper, trunk, fender and taillights, but the only
damage to the front of the LeBaron was the grill. (R. 774 at 179: 6-22; R. 776.) The
Nova driven by Mr. Perez only sustained minimal damage as a result of the impact and
Mr. Perez had no physical injury. (R. 774 at 237:13-16; R. 774 at 130; R. 774 at 258:5259:9; R. 774 at 257:18-21) The repairs to Mr. Pruneda's LeBaron only amounted to
$1,518.14. (R. 774 at 177:15.)
The Prunedas' Medical Treatment

5

The Prunedas did not seek immediate medical attention for any potential injury
related to the accident. (R. 774 at 25: 17-19.) Rather, a day or two after the accident Mr.
Pruneda and his six children first sought treatment at Total Health Institute. (R. 774 at
25: 17-25; R. 780-786.) Approximately ten days later they then went to a chiropractor,
Dr. Gordon McLean. (R. 774 at 25: 15-17; R. 780-786.) On the intake forms at Dr.
McLean's office, Mr. Pruneda listed his attorney as the person who had referred him to
the McLean clinic. (R. 780 at PRUSER0025.)
At Dr. McLean's, the Prunedas received a considerable amount of chiropractic
treatment considering the low impact nature of the accident. Donavan, age 12, received
42 visits in just nine months. (R. 781.) Anthony, age 10, made 40 visits in that same
timeframe. (R. 782.) Sergio Jr., age 7 made 41 visits, and Cozy, age 8 made 45. (R.
783-784.) Matthew and Zennia, ages four and two, made 31 and 30 visits respectively in
a four month period between August and December 2002. (R. 785-786.)
Experts at Trial
The Prunedas designated their treating physician, Dr. Mclean, as an expert, and
specifically indicated that he would give testimony as to ;*care and treatment." (R. 80-81;
773 at 39:19-21, 773 at 51:4-5.) However, they gave no notice that they intended to elicit
Dr. McLean's opinion on the issue of causation. (Id.)
At trial, Dr. Jayne Clark gave expert testimony regarding the necessity and
propriety of Dr. McLean's extensive treatment of the Prunedas. (R. 775 at 26-131.)
While not a chiropractor, Dr. Clark is a physiatrist and expert in spinal injuries and care.
(R. 775 at 27:11-17; 28:1.)
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Also at trial, Dr. Paul France, an accident ^constructionist gave expert opinion
regarding the sequence of events involved in the accident. (R. 774 at 169-246.) Dr.
France reached his conclusions by performing calculations using physics equations
involving kinematics of the vehicles, including speed, acceleration, distances, and
momentum. (R. 187.) (Dr. France's Preliminary Investigation Report containing a
description of the methodology used). This methodology for calculating vehicle
kinematics is commonly used and accepted by accident reconstructionists. (R. 778 at
66:18-25; R. 774 at 175:15-18; R. 774 at 119:18-23.)
In this particular case, Dr. France formed his expert opinion after examining
information contained in the following materials: impact studies involving similar
vehicles, results of three-vehicle crash tests he personally performed, the traffic accident
report prepared by the officer responding to the accident, vehicle repair estimates,
photographs of the Prunedas' vehicle and Columbia Steel's vehicle after the accident,
vehicle specifications from commercially available databases, and deposition testimony
of Sergio Pruneda, Richard Gray of Columbia Steel, Elisha Archuleta and Victor Perez
(whose vehicle was hit by the Prunedas after they were rear-ended by Richard Gray). (R.
187; R. 774 at 176:12-25; R. 778 at 34:4-10.) Although there was damage to the
Prunedas' vehicle not indicated in the repair estimates, Dr. France testified that the
photographs he reviewed showed damage not indicated in the repair estimates, and, that
he took into account the damage revealed in the photographs. (R. 778, at 24-25.)
Additionally, Dr. France made clear that he was able to ascertain the damage to Mr.
Perez's Nova, which was hit by the Prunedas vehicle, through the detailed description of
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the damage provided by Mr. Perez in his deposition. (R. 778 at 24-25; R. 777 at 17-18.)
Dr. France also explained that he was able to calculate the speed of the vehicles in this
accident, at the time of impact, by running an "iterative equation" to determine the Delta
V, which variable represents the car's change in speed. (R. 774 at 222:5-224:8.) In this
process, Dr. France ran this iterative equation until he found a Delta V that matched with
all the known damage to the vehicles and other known factual evidence about the
collision. (R. 774 at 222:20-25.) Once Dr. France found a Delta V number that matched
with the other known factual evidence, he was able to determine the impact speed of the
vehicles. (R. 774 at 224:1-3.)
The Jury Instruction
At trial the Prunedas proposed and stipulated to a jury instruction that made it
appear that the jury had the option of awarding general damages, even if special damages
were awarded. (R. 577-599.) This jury instruction stated:
If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
then it is your duty to award the plaintiff such damages, if any, that you
find, from a preponderance of the evidence, will fairly and adequately
compensate the plaintiff for the injury and damage sustained.
(R. 659) (emphasis added). The language from this instruction is repeated on the special
verdict form filled out by the jury. (R. 701) ("If, and only if, the amount of special
damages is $3,000 or more, then state the amount of general damages, if any, you
award.") (emphasis added). The Prunedas' did not object to the special verdict form
before it was given to the jury. (R. 775 at 217-218) (issuance of the special verdict form
to the jury and no indication of objection from the Prunedas).
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It was only after the jury returned a verdict that the Prunedas first objected to the
jury instruction on damage and the special verdict form. (R. 775 at 284.) After making
an objection, counsel for the Prunedas stated, "I've come instruction prepared." (R. 775
at 284:17-18.) He then proceeded to present the court with a revised instruction on
damages. {See id.) After objection from Columbia Steel and Richard Gray, the trial
court judge repeatedly asked counsel for the Prunedas why he did not present this
instruction prior to the jury's return of a verdict.1 The trial court then concluded that the
Prunedas had waived their right to challenge the instructions or special verdict form by
participating in the drafting of the instructions and stipulating the special verdict form.
(R. 775 at 289:22-23.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point 1:

The Prunedas Waived Their Right to Challenge Jury
Instructions

This Court should affirm the trial court's denial of the Prunedas' request to submit
revised jury instructions on the issue of damages where the Prunedas helped draft the
very instructions they claim were erroneous and where the Prunedas only challenged the
jury instructions after the jury had returned its special verdict. In Utah, it is well settled
that a party is precluded from challenging a jury instruction that the party helped draft or
otherwise approved. Where the Prunedas expressly approved the jury instruction they
1

(R. 775 at 284:19-20) ("Why didn't you prepare a verdict to suggest that?"); (R. 775 at
286:4-6) ("Is there a reason why you didn't present an instruction, and why you didn't
craft the verdict to reflect this need?"); (R. 775 at 286:16-19) ("My question is if you
think this is an error and they should have been instructed, why did you not present an
instruction? You never presented this instruction you're seeking.").
9

now claim was defective, they have waived their right to challenge the instruction at a
later stage of the proceedings.
Point 2:

The Jury Instruction for General Damages Was Appropriate

If this court does not find that waiver occurred, it should nonetheless affirm the
trial court's decision because the jury instruction on damages was not improper. Where
the Prunedas' complaints of pain and suffered were largely subjective and their
credibility was questioned, it is proper for a jury to award special damages and decline to
award general damages. Accordingly, a jury instruction that gave the option of awarding
general damages was thus permissible.
Point 3:

The Prunedas' Treating Physician's Testimony On Causation
Was Properly Excluded

This court should also affirm the trial court's discretionary decision to exclude the
Prunedas' treating physician's testimony regarding causation of the Prunedas' injuries.
The trial court properly excluded such testimony because the Prunedas' failed to
designate their treating physician as an expert who would testify on the issue of
causation. Because the Prunedas only designated their treating physician to give
testimony as to matters of ^care and treatment," Defendants Columbia Steel and Richard
Gray did not have any notice of the causation testimony the Prunedas intended to elicit.
As an additional ground for excluding the causation testimony, the Prunedas' treating
physician failed to submit a Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert report, which would have been
required were he to testify as to matters of causation. Ultimately, however, exclusion of
the testimony, if improper, amounted to mere harmless error because the jury ultimately

10

found that causation had occurred, even without the treating physician's expert testimony
on causation.
In light of the trial court's standing order, the trial court appropriately issued a
curative instruction after causation testimony was elicited from the Prunedas' treating
physician and redacted portions of the record that also constituted causation testimony
from the treating physician. This was appropriate as counsel for Columbia Steel timely
objected to the elicitation of the causation testimony and timely requested curative
instructions and redaction.
Point 4:

Dr. France's Expert Accident Reconstruction Testimony Was
Properly Admitted.

This court should also affirm the trial court's discretionary decision to admit the
expert testimony of Dr. Paul France, an accident reconstructionist. Where an expert's
testimony is not based on novel scientific principles or techniques, a court properly
admits the expert testimony where it is based on reports, writings, and observations of a
type reasonably relied on by experts in the same field. In a prior case, this Court has
specifically held that Dr. France's expert accident reconstruction testimony is not based
on novel scientific principles and techniques. Thus, the trial court in this case correctly
found that Dr. France's testimony was based on reports, writings, and observations of a
type reasonably relied upon by other accident reconstructionists and properly admitted
the testimony.
Point 5:

Dr. Clark's Expert Testimony Regarding Necessity and
Propriety of the Medical Care the Prunedas Received Was
Properly Admitted,

11

Finally, this court should affirm the trial court's decision to admit the expert
testimony of Dr. Jayne Clark regarding the necessity and propriety of the medical care
provided by the Prunedas' treating physician, a chiropractor, because Dr. Clark is
knowledgeable about the amount of care needed to treat soft tissue spinal injuries. Utah
law is clear that an expert in a different field than a treating physician may nonetheless
comment on care provided by a treating physician where the expert is knowledgeable
about the standard of care relevant to such injuries. As a specialist in spinal treatment,
Dr. Clark was qualified to testify about a chiropractor's treatment of spinal injuries and
the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting her testimony related to such.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE PRECLUDES THE PRUNEDAS
FROM CHALLENGING THE ISSUE OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON
APPEAL WHERE THEY DRAFTED AND APPROVED THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS THEY NOW CHALLENGE, THEREBY
MISLEADING THE COURT AND INVITING ERROR.
Pursuant to the invited error doctrine, the Prunedas waived their right to challenge

the jury instruction regarding damages on appeal where they participated in the drafting
of the original instruction and approved the same, thereby inviting the error of which they
now complain. The invited error doctrine provides that "a jury instruction may not be
assigned as error . . . 4 if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to
the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction."' State v. Geukgeuzian,
86 P.3d 742, 744 (Utah 2004). This is true even where a party's "failure to include
[particular wording in the] proposed instruction was most likely inadvertent and not a
conscious attempt to mislead the trial court.'' Id. at 745
12

The rationale behind the invited error doctrine is well established and sound. The
Utah Supreme Court has made clear that "a party cannot take advantage of an error
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." Id. at
744 (quoting State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993))). Thus the "invited error doctrine is crafted to
discourage[] parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a
hidden ground for reversal on appeal, [and] it is also intended to give the trial court the
first opportunity to address the claim of error." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Furthermore, this doctrine applies to invited errors in both civil and criminal cases. See
Pratt v. Nelson, 127 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (applying the invited error
doctrine to jury instructions used in a civil case).
The invited error doctrine is consistent with the holdings of courts in other
jurisdictions, which courts have examined the issue as it relates to jury instructions
striking similar to those in this case. In Wright v. Jackson, a plaintiff injured in a car
accident tendered jury instructions regarding damages allowed the jury to "fairly and
reasonably compensation [plaintiff] for her mental anguish and physical suffering which
she has endured and may in the future endure, by reason of any injury she may have
received, if any . ..." 329 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959) (emphasis added). In
addition to this instruction, the jury was told that "if they found for [the plaintiff], they
could compensate her for medical expenses incurred, not to exceed the sum of $202." Id.
The jury returned a verdict for $202, which although not specified as special damages,
matched the amount allowed. Id.
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In response to the plaintiffs objection to the lack of an award for general
damages, the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated, "[ojrdinarily, in a case such as the one
we are now considering, the jury would be required to make some award for pain and
suffering." Id. Notwithstanding this general rule, the court "held that any inconsistency
in the verdict will not require a reversal where a plaintiff, as was done here, had offered
an instruction which invited the error complained of afterwards." Id. The court then
specifically noted that "the reiterated use of the phrase 'if any' appears after each item of
damages in question" in the jury instructions for general damages tendered by the
plaintiff. Id. at 561-62 (emphasis added). Thus, the court reasoned, "the jury was led to
believe it had the right to grant or deny an award under each of these subjects." Id. at
562. In conclusion the court cited the principle contained in the invited error doctrine,
that "a party is estopped to take advantage of an error produced by his own act," and
affirmed the award even though it did not allow for general pain and suffering. Id.
In the present case, the Prunedas affirmatively represented to the court that they
had no objection to a jury instruction regarding general damages that also included an ; if
any" qualifying phrase, since the Prunedas themselves had proposed the instruction. (R.
577-599.) This instruction stated:
If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
then it is your duty to award the plaintiff such damages, if any, that you
find, from a preponderance of the evidence, will fairly and adequately
compensate the plaintiff for the injury and damage sustained.
2

See also Grenz v. Kelsch, 436 N.W.2d 552, 554-55 (N. Dak. 1989) (noting that where a
jury instruction stated that the jury could award ^reasonable compensation for pain . . . .
suffered by the Plaintiff. . ., if any, . . . the jury was led to believe that it was entitled to
grant or deny an award of damages.").
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(R. 659) (emphasis added). Not only did the Pmnedas stipulate to this instruction, but the
Prunedas actually proposed this instruction. (R. 577.) The language from this
instruction is repeated on the special verdict form filled out by the jury. (R. 701) ("If, and
only if, the amount of special damages is $3,000 or more, then state the amount of
general damages, if any, you award."). The Prunedas' did not object to the special
verdict form before it was given to the jury, as evidenced by lack of any indication in the
record to such. (R. 775 at 217-218) (issuance of the special verdict form to the jury and
no indication of objection from the Prunedas).
It was only after the jury returned a verdict that the Prunedas objected to the jury
instruction on damage and the special verdict form. (R. 775 at 284.) Immediately upon
objection, counsel for the Prunedas presented the court with a pre-made, revised
instruction on damages. (R. 775 at 284:17-18) ("I've come instruction prepared."). In
response to the Prunedas' objection and sudden presentation of revised instruction on
damages, the trial court asked, "Why didn't you prepare a verdict to suggest that?" (R.
775 at 284:19-20.) Then the court, speaking to the Prunedas' attorney, stated, "You've
written this verdict, you've stipulated to it," (R. 775 at 284:24-25.) Upon further
discussion, the court pressed counsel for the Prunedas for an explanation of this sudden
objection by asking, "Is there a reason why you didn't present an instruction, and why
you didn't craft the verdict to reflect this need?" (R. 775 at 286:4-6.) The trial court
clarified its concern by again asking, "My question is if you think this is an error and they
should have been instructed, why did you not present an instruction? You never
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presented this instruction you're seeking." (R. 775 at 286:16-19.) In conclusion, the trial
court stated to counsel for the Prunedas, "I think you've stipulated to this verdict form
which waived that right." (R. 775 at 289:22-23.)
Regardless of whether the Prunedas' failure to raise these issues regarding jury
instructions on damages were inadvertent or a conscious attempt to preserve a hidden
ground for appeal, their failure to do so constituted invited error. The jury instructions,
which the Prunedas' proposed, and the special verdict form, to which the Prunedas'
attorney stipulated, contained language that led the jury to believe that it had a right to
deny general damages even if special damages were awarded. By using the phrase "if
any" in connection with the award of general damages, it is understandable that juror
would believe it had the option of making a general damage award.
Having invited the very error they now seek to challenge, the Prunedas are
precluded and have waived their right to challenge this issue by proposing and ultimately
agreeing to the jury instructions and special verdict forms that contained the alleged error.
II.

IN THE EVENT THAT THE PRUNEDAS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR
RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS, THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO RESUBMIT TO THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS THAT WOULD DIRECT AN AWARD OF
"SUBSTANTIAL" GENERAL DAMAGES BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS
NOT ENTITLED TO GENERAL DAMAGES, OR EVEN NOMINAL
DAMAGES, WHERE THE PRUNEDAS' COMPLAINTS OF PAIN AND
SUFFERING WERE SUBJECTIVE AND HIS CREDIBILITY WAS
QUESTIONED.
The trial court did not err in refusing to resubmit a revised instruction to the jury

directing the jury to award "substantial" general damages because of their award of
special damages for Mr. Pruneda's medical expenses in an amount that exceeded the
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personal injury protection threshold of $3,000. Although, "as a general rule, it is
improper for jury to award special damages without awarding any general damages,"
Balderas v. Starks, 138 P.3d 75, 79 (Utah Ct. App. 2006), there are relevant exceptions to
that general rule. One such exception arises "when the issue of general damages is
contested . . . [and] the plaintiffs complaints are subjective and his or her credibility is
questioned." 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages §43 (1988).
A case illustrative of this general exception is Eisele v. Rood, 551 P.2d 441 (Or.
1976). In Eisele, the plaintiff filed an action for personal injuries allegedly received in a
rear-end accident at a stop light. Id. at 442. Although liability was not seriously
controverted, "there was conflicting testimony as to whether plaintiff actually suffered a
substantial injury and incurred any general damages." Id. More specifically, testimony
put forward by the plaintiffs treating physician, a chiropractor, conflicted with testimony
put forward by the independent medical examiner, a medical doctor retained by the
defendants. Id.
Ultimately the court in Eisele concluded that "under the pleadings and the
evidence in a particular case, the jury could consistently find that the plaintiff suffered
special damages but no general damages [and that] a verdict for special damages alone
was proper." Id. at 443. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the record
"disclose[d] that plaintiffs symptoms were primarily subjective." Id, at 442. Although
plaintiffs chiropractor gave testimony of the plaintiffs injuries, the court astutely noted
that "[t]he testimony of plaintiff s chiropractor was based primarily upon plaintiffs
subjective complaints." Id. at 444. The court also noted that the "[p]laintiff s own
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testimony is punctuated by periods of forgetfiilness and inconsistencies." Id. at 442.
Additionally, other admissions by the plaintiff at trial brought his credibility into
question. Id. (citing an admission that plaintiff had previously faked an injury).
In light of the subjective nature of the injury and the issues of credibility, the court
reasoned that "the jury could have rationally concluded that plaintiff was grossly
exaggerating the extent of his injuries and that, on balance, the medical testimony did not
demonstrate that plaintiff suffered any substantial injuries as a result of the accident." Id.
And, at the same time "the jury could have also concluded that plaintiff did incur some
reasonable expenses for diagnosis and treatment." Id. Under this reasoning, it an award
consisting of only special damages is not improper.
The reasoning used by the Eisele court is consistent with the case law in Utah, as
nominal damages will suffice where general damages must be awarded, regardless of
whether the special damages are above or below PIP threshold for medical expenses.
First, it should be noted that nothing in Utah Code Section 31A-22-309 requires a
"substantial^ award of general damages where a plaintiffs medical expenses exceed
$3,000. Rather, the statute merely grants a person a right to maintain an action for
general damages in the event that a person incurs medical expenses in excess of $3,000
due to injuries received in an automobile accident. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22309(1).
More generally, Utah courts have repeatedly affirmed awards of nominal general
damages connected with a more substantial special damage award. In Tingey v.
Christensen, a plaintiff was awarded $1,459.92 in special damages, an amount equal to
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the plaintiffs emergency room expenses on the day of the accident, but only awarded
$1.00 for general damages. 987 P.2d 588, 590 (Utah 1999). Upon appellate review, the
Utah Supreme Court stated, "[tjhis is not an unusual award, especially in rear-end auto
accidents with conflicting evidence on damages." Id. at 592. The court noted that w'the
verdict [was] consistent with the evidence,5' and specifically cited the fact that the
accident was minor and the speed of the cars at collision was 5 to 14 miles per hour. Id.
Similarly, in Martineau v. Anderson, the court found no problems with a jury instruction
which directed a jury "if they found special damages, . . . to find general damages, even
though they (general damages) might be nominal." 636 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Utah 1981).
On the other hand, none of the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the Prunedas
stand for, or even address, the proposition that nominal damages may not be awarded in
conjunction with an award of special damages. In Shewry v. Heuer, 121 N.W.2d 529
(Iowa 1963), the court did not hold that nominal damages were inappropriate where
special damages were awarded. Instead, the court held that the jury could not fail to
award anything in general damages when it awarded special damages for medical
services. Id. at 532. It did not address the narrower issue of whether an award of
nominal damage is appropriate in light of a more substantial award of special damages.
Likewise, Kepley v. Kim, 843 P.2d 133 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992), does not stand for
the proposition that nominal damages are insufficient when an award of special damages
in excess of $3,000 is award. As in Shewry, the jury awarded special damages and then
failed to award any general damage, even a nominal amount. Id. at 137. Thus, the only
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issue considered by the court was whether an award of special damages was consistent
with a lack of award for general damages. Id. Nominal damages were not considered.
Finally, even the Utah case cited by the Prunedas does not address the narrow
issue of the propriety of a jury verdict that awards special damages, and only nominal
general damages. In Foote v. Clark, the court only provided the definition of nominal
damages, and the holding of the case was simply that u[a]llowing an award for nominal
damages of more than merely a trivial sum, however small, would subvert the role of
nominal damages as a means of acknowledging invaded rights without rewarding a
successful party for nonexistent damages." 962 P.2d 52, 58 (Utah 1998). It is not
surprising that the Prunedas cannot point to Utah precedent addressing this issue, as this
Court stated last year that it is "unaware of any binding authority . . . addressing [the
issue of] the propriety of a jury verdict that awards special damages, and only nominal
damages." Balder as v. Starks, 138 P.3d 75, 79 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). Even if nominal
damages were available to the Prunedas, remand would not be appropriate as Utah courts
will not remand for a new trial where the only issue on remand is nominal damages. See
Holmes Dew, LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895, 906 (Utah 2002) ("[W]e generally do not
remand if the damages are only nominal").
This court should affirm the Prunedas' award of special damages and no general
damages as the Prunedas' case fits precisely into an acknowledged exception to the
general rule that an award of general damages must accompany an award of special
damages and where they would not necessarily be entitled to anything more than nominal
damages. The Prunedas' complaints of injury were largely subjective and their treating
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physician's testimony regarding their injury was based largely on these subjective
complaints. Moreover, the testimony with respect to the injuries and amount of treatment
needed was conflicting. See Section V, infra. And finally, nothing in Utah law requires a
jury to award the Prunedas' anything more than nominal damages if the jury could not
find evidence of general pain and suffering, even despite the medical expenses. Even if
entitled to nominal damages, remand on this issue would be inappropriate as it violates a
long established policy of refusing to remand for a new trial if the damages are only
nominal.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
EXCLUDING THE PRUNEDAS5 TREATING PHYSICIAN'S
TESTIMONY REGARDING CAUSATION BECAUSE THE
PHYSICIAN WAS NOT DESIGNATED TO TESTIFY TO SUCH, THE
PHYSICIAN FAILED TO PROVIDE AN EXPERT REPORT, AND THE
EXCLUSION OF THE PHYSICIAN'S CAUSATION TESTIMONY DID
NOT RESULT IN PREJUDICE OR OTHERWISE AFFECT THE
JURY'S VERDICT,
The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion by excluding the Prunedas'

treating physician's testimony regarding causation of the Prunedas' injuries gi\en the
Prunedas' failure to designate him to testify for such and the physician's failure to
provide an expert report. A court has broad discretion in deciding to admit or bar
testimony for failure to adhere to adhere to discovery obligations. See Huyot-Renoir v.
Wilkinson, 2006 UT App 186 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (quoting State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d
1167, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("[A] trial court's decision to admit or bar testimony for
failure to adhere to discovery obligations lies within the trial court's discretion.'*). This is
coupled with a trial court's similar discretion in ;%determin[ing] . . . who qualifies as an
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expert witness and the admission of the witness's testimony." Haupt v. Heaps, 131 P.3d
252 (Utah Ct. App. 2005).
The Prunedas first ran afoul of their obligations in two respects. First, the
Prunedas failed to give notice of their intent to elicit expert testimony from their treating
physician beyond the two matters stated in their designation: "treatment and care."
Secondly, even had notice been given, the Prunedas5 treating physician failed to provide
a Rule 26(a)(3)(B) expert report, as would be required by a physician testifying to matters
beyond treatment and care, such as matters of causation. Nevertheless, even if the court
abused its discretion in limiting the Prunedas' treating physician's testimony to matters of
treatment and in excluding his testimony as to causation, the error was harmless given
that the jury nonetheless determined that the defendants had caused the Prunedas'
injuries.
As a result of the Prunedas' failure to meet these discovery obligations, it was not
improper for the court to exclude the treating physician's causation testimony and
subsequently give a curative instruction when the treating physician testified regarding
causation in violation of the court exclusionary order, nor was it improper for the court to
have redacted those portions of the treating physician's records that constituted opinion
testimony as to causation.
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Excluding the
Prunedas' Treating Physician's Testimony Regarding Causation
Because the Prunedas Only Designated Him to Testify as to "Care and
Treatment" and Gave No Notice of Their Intent to Elicit Causation
Testimony.
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the Prunedas' treating
physician's testimony regarding causation due to the Prunedas' failure to designate him
as a causation witness. A trial court is not beyond the bounds of its discretion where it
bars an expert witness from testifying due to a party's failure to make proper
designations. DeBryv. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1360-61 (Utah 1994)
(excluding expert witness testimony due to a party's failure to designate the expert within
the relevant deadlines). This is particularly true where the designating party has "no
surprise, no unforeseen circumstances, or any other legitimate excuse for their [failure to
properly designate the witness]." Id. Excluding testimony not properly designated is
proper to prevent the prejudice that would result due to a lack of notice, which notice
"gives both parties the opportunity to prepare adequately for trial, including among other
things, deposing witnesses, investigating witnesses' testimony and preparing an effective
cross-examination." Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1994). Exclusion is a
proper response even where defense counsel could have potentially anticipated the
expert's testimony because "it is not defendant's duty to anticipate and prepare for all
potential, yet undisclosed, expert [testimony]." State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1171
(UtahCt.App. 1998).
The Prunedas only designated their treating physician to testify as an expert on
matters of ucare and treatment." (R. 80-81.) Counsel for the Prunedas conceded such in
the hearing on Columbia Steel's motion to exclude the treating physician from testifying
to matters of causation, stating WT just said that he was the treating physician and he was
going to testify regarding his care and treatment/" (R. 773 at 39:19-21.) Nothing in the
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designation gives any notice that the treating physician will go beyond matters relating to
treatment and care, to issues of causation of the alleged injuries. (R. 773 at 51:4-5.)
Given this lack of notice, the trial court was well within its discretion to exclude
the Prunedas* treating physician's testimony with respect to causation while it admitted
his testimony as to the matters for which he was designated: treatment and care.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Excluding the
Prunedas' Treating Physician's Testimony Regarding Causation
Because the Treating Physician Failed to provide a Rule 26(a)(3)(B)
Expert Report
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the Prunedas' treating
physician's testimony regarding causation because he failed to provide a Rule
26(a)(3)(B) expert report, which report is required of a treating physician when he ;%steps
into the shoes" of a retained expert by testifying to causation. Although this Court has
held that a treating physician testifying only to "a factual description of his or her
personal observations during treatment" need not be identified as an expert or provide an
expert report, this Court likewise acknowledges that a 'treating physician who has
formulated opinions going beyond what was necessary to provide appropriate care for the
injured party steps into the shoes of a retained expert for purposes of [r]ule 26." Pete v.
Youngblood, 141 P.3d 629, 634-35(Utah Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Thomas v.
Consolidated Rail Corp,, 169 F.R.D. 1, 2-3 (D. Mass. 1996)) (emphasis added).
In making that acknowledgement, this Court drew from Thomas v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 169 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D. Mass. 1996), which case addresses precisely the issue of
admitting a treating physician's testimony as to causation without an accompanying Rule
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26 report. In Thomas, the District Court of Massachusetts held that a treating physician
crosses the boundary between an expert who must merely be disclosed and an expert who
must provide a report when the treating physician attempts to testify specifically on the
topic of "causation and prognosis.v Thomas, 169 F.R.D. at 3.
Subsequent to its holding in Thomas, the District Court of Massachusetts refined
its holding and acknowledged that a treating physician may at times testify without the
submission of a Rule 26 expert report, "even where their testimony relates to causation
and prognosis." Garcia v. City of Springfield Police Dept., 230 F.R.D. 247, 248 (D.
Mass. 2005). However, the court emphatically held that a treating physician's testimony,
when unaccompanied by a report, must stay within certain boundaries to remain
admissible. Id. at 249 (noting that '"none of the cases [cited by the plaintiff] stands for the
proposition that testimony regarding causation and prognosis is always admissible absent
an expert report so long as the witness is a treating care-provider"). The court declared
that the boundary between admissible and inadmissible testimony of a treating physician
is determined by "the foundation of the expert witness's opinion and the scope of the
testimony." Id; see also Stone v. Deagle, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90430, 9 (D. Colo.
2006) ("As a practical matter, the disclosure requirements under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) should
not turn on the expert's label or classification^ but instead it] is the substance of the
expert's testimony, not the status of the expert, which dictates whether a Rule 26(a)(2)(B)
report will be required."). Thus, a treating physician's testimony crosses that boundary
and becomes inadmissible where it extends beyond his or her "personal knowledge and
observations obtained during the course of care and treatment" or in the event that the
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treating physician "was . . . specially retained in connection with the litigation or for
trial." Garcia, 230 F.R.D. at 249.
In this case, the Prunedas' treating physician's opinion as to causation extends
beyond facts made known to him during the course of his care and treatment of the
Prunedas. In order to discuss the cause of the Prunedas' reported injuries, the Prunedas'
treating physician, Dr. McLean, would have to go beyond what could be gleaned from a
chiropractic consultation with and treatment of the Prunedas. Dr. McLean is not a
biomechanical engineer, did not witness the subject accident, and did not have an
understanding of the impact aside from unverified speed estimates given by Mr. Pruneda.
(R. 780 at PRUSER0014.) While Dr. McLean may understand that car accidents can
cause certain soft tissue injuries, he would have to go beyond his observations made
during treatment of the Prunedas to determine the issue of causation. Thus, by attempting
to offer causation testimony Dr. McLean was acting as a causation expert, and was
required to submit a Rule 26 disclosure regarding his qualifications and opinions, which
he did not do.
Furthermore, it also appears that the Prunedas were referred to Dr. McLean by the
very counsel that represented them at trial and now on appeal. The Prunedas listed
Edward Wells, their current attorney, as their referral source on their intake forms at Dr.
McLean's office. (R. 780 at PRUSER0025.) While not a formal retainer for purposes of
litigation, it does suggest a special relationship between counsel and the treating
physician which infers that the treating physician was retained for purposes of litigation.
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C. Even if the Court Abused its Discretion by Excluding the Prunedas5
Treating Physician's Causation Testimony, Exclusion was Harmless
Error as the Jury Determined Causation Had Occurred Even Absent
the Treating Physician's Testimony.
Nevertheless, even if the trial court improperly excluded Dr. McLean's testimony
regarding causation, the error was harmless as his testimony regarding causation was
cumulative and the lack of his causation testimony did not affect the jury's verdict.
Where a court's error is harmless, the decision of the trial court may be affirmed without
remand. See Office of the Guardian ad Litem v. H.M. (State ex rel S.M.), 2007 UT 21, ^f
62 (Utah 2007) (%i[T]he error was harmless . . . . We therefore affirm the decision of the
[lower] court."). Thus, where expert testimony may be cumulative, erroneous exclusion
will not justify remand. See id. (citing the cumulative nature of the excluded expert
testimony as part of the reason the error of excluding such testimony was harmless).
Additionally, where there is no convincing evidence that "excluding this testimony
affected the jury's verdict... the error was harmless" and no remand is necessary.
Green v Louder, 29 P.3d 638, 645-646 (Utah 2001).
In this case, the jury's verdict made clear that the jury found that causation had in
fact occurred. (R. 702.) The jury found for the Prunedas, which meant that the jury
found that Richard Gray of Columbia Steel had caused damage to the Prunedas. Even if
Dr. McLean had testified as to causation, his testimony would have been cumulative to
the other evidence of causation, which evidence standing alone was sufficiently
persuasive to the jury.
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At most, the jury's verdict, which included an award of damages smaller than the
amount the Prunedas' requested, demonstrated a reluctance about the amount of damage,
not the fact of causation or even the fact of damage. Dr. McLean's testimony regarding
causation would have had little, if any, effect on the jury's deliberation of the amount of
damage. In fact, at trial Dr. McLean was permitted to testify to matters relating to the
amount of damage. (R. 773 at 70:8-13, 83:19-97:3, 97:4-112:3, 113:18-121:13, 123:5128:9, 128:23-151:15, 151:15-159:13) (describing injuries reported by the Prunedas
during the course of their treatment with Dr. McLean). Dr. McLean testified as to the
type and amount of treatment he gave the Prunedas and he presented evidence to the jury
as to the costs associated with those treatments, (id; see also R. 773:22-106:13)
(describing treatment methods used on the Prunedas); (R. 773 at 82:9, 100:11, 112:3,
121:1, 128:9, 151:5, 158:4) (listing the total cost of treatment given to Mr. Pruneda and
his six children).
Where Dr. McLean's causation testimony would not have affected the ultimate
jury verdict, the exclusion of such testimony is harmless error. Given the other evidence
and testimony respecting causation, Dr. McLean's causation testimony obviously was not
needed for the jury to find in favor of the Prunedas. Dr. McLean's causation testimony
also would not have been relevant to or influential on the area that the jury may have had
reluctance, namely, the amount of general damages. Therefore, even if the trial court
committed error, it was harmless at best and it is not necessary to remand for a new trial
on the issue of damages.
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D. In Light of the Court's Order, The Court Appropriately Issued a
Curative Instruction After Causation Testimony was Elicited from the
Treating Physician and Appropriately Redacted Portions of the
Record that also Constituted Causation Testimony from the Treating
Physician.
The court properly granted Columbia Steel's request for a curative instruction
where testimony was elicited from the Prunedas' treating physician that violated the
court's standing order prohibiting the treating physician from testifying to matters of
causation. Eliciting testimony in violation of a court's order, which excluded such
testimony, is improper and could even render counsel in contempt of court. See State v.
Clark, 124 P.3d 235, 238 (Utah 2005) (identifying six contemptuous acts, one of which
was eliciting testimony in violation of a court order on a motion in limine). Where
testimony subject to a court order is not necessarily elicited by counsel, but is voluntarily
proffered by the witness himself, the testimony is still improper and may be remedied
through a curative instruction. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271 (Utah 1998)
(noting that a trial judge may issue a curative instruction which directs a jury to disregard
either an improper question or "an improper answer a witness has given").
Counsel need not object the exact moment testimony subject to a court's
exclusionary- order is elicited to properly receive a curative instruction regarding the
prohibited testimony. In State v. Harmon, a witness proffered testimony regarding his
invocation of his Miranda rights, which testimony ran afoul of a prior motion in limine
excluding such testimony. 956 P.2d 262, 267 (Utah 1998). Counsel for the defense did
not object at the exact moment the witness admitted to having invoked his Miranda
rights, but instead waited for the witness to finish testifying. Id. Counsel explained that
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"he had not objected during [the witness]5s testimony because he did not want to draw
attention to [the improperly elicited evidence] and was not expecting the prosecutor to
violate the court's pretrial order suppressing such evidence." Id. Upon being alerted of
the improper testimony judge "offered to give a curative instruction to the jury." Id.
Although counsel in that case ultimately declined the judge's offer, the Utah
Supreme Court found that a curative instruction was a proper remedy where testimony is
elicited in violation of a standing court order. The Utah Supreme Court stated that
''curative instructions are a settled and necessary feature of our judicial process and one
of the most important tools by which a court may remedy errors at trial." Id. at 271.
Furthermore, "[t]here is rarely a case in which a trial judge is not called upon to affirm an
attorney's objection and instruct the jury to disregard an improper question or an
improper answer a witness has given." Id. The Utah Supreme Court then stated that "if a
trial judge could not correct errors as they occur, few trials would be successfully
concluded." Id.
An objection to erroneous questions or answers given at trial is not untimely
where it is made while the witness is still being examined. Even under the timeliness
requirements of the ^contemporaneous objection" rule, a party's objection fails to be
timely or specific enough to merit consideration on a appeal only where the party failed
to raise the evidentiary challenge in a motion in limine, failed to adequately describe the
evidence or the grounds for the challenge in a motion in limine, failed to make any
objection whatsoever at trial, or only made an objection after a significant delay. See
State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986) (refusing to review an evidentiary
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challenge because "[a]t no time did counsel offer specific objections on the grounds
[raised on appeal]"); State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1308 (Utah 1986) (refusing review
of the evidentiary challenge because "defendant's motion in limine did not adequately
describe the criminal act he was worried about [admitting into evidence]'5); State v.
Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 301 (Utah 1988) (granting review of an evidentiary challenge to a
statement made by one witness during trial, but not to a related statement made by a
second person because the attorney only objected to the first witness's statement at trial);
State v. John, 667 P.2d 32, 33-34 (Utah 1983) (considering an objection untimely). A
significant delay is evident in extreme cases where "[t]he only objection before appeal
was made a day after the testimony claimed to have been prejudicial was given, and after
the prosecution had rested." John, 667 P.2d at 33-34 (emphasis added).
Counsel for Columbia Steel timely objected to the elicitation of the Prunedas'
treating physician's testimony regarding causation, which testimony had been excluded
by a court ruling just minutes before the treating physician took the stand to testify. In its
ruling, the court stated that the treating physician could testify as to the history provided
to him by the Prunedas, including that they reported having been in an automobile
accident. (R. 773 at 54.) However, the court's ruling prohibited the treating physician
from giving opinion testimony as to the cause of the Prunedas' injuries. Id.
In the first portion of his direct examination of the Prunedas' treating physician,
counsel for the Prunedas asked whether the injuries identified by the treating physician
"[a]re . . . things that the patient can cause by himself?" (R. 773 at 72.) While this
bordered on objectionable, counsel for Columbia Steel admittedly made no objection.
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(See id.) Shortly thereafter, and in response to a general question about the treating
physician's treatment plan, the treating physician then voluntarily read from his records
that "the patient has reached MMI for injuries related to the automobile accident"
thereby suggesting that the accident caused the injuries. (R. 773 at 96) (emphasis added).
When the treating physician again volunteered causation testimony in response to a
question not specifically calling for causation testimony, Counsel for Columbia Steel
timely objected. (R. 773 at 101.) In a side bar to the court, Counsel for Columbia Steel
indicated that this voluntary testimony related to causation and thereby violated the
court's order. (R. 773 at 101-102.) Counsel for the Prunedas offered to clarify the
treating physician's testimony by asking follow-up questions that did not call for a
causation assessment. (Id. at 102.) The treating physician volunteered testimony that
suggested causation three additional times by stating that the Prunedas' injuries were
"related to the automobile accident." (R, 773 at 111: 14, 124:9, 133:4-5.) Each time this
testimony was in response to generic questions about the treating physician's assessment
of the Prunedas' progress. (See id.)
At this point, Counsel for Columbia Steel again objected to the testimony on the
grounds that it violated the court's standing order and Columbia Steel asked the Court to
instruct the jury to disregard the treating physician's statements as to causation. (R. 773
at 133.) Counsel for Columbia Steel later explained to the court that the objectionable
testimony was being volunteered by the witness, which made it difficult to object prior to
the testimony actually being given. (R. 773 at 147, 133:11-12) (defense counsel
explaining that the objectionable testimony was not due to plaintiffs' counsel's questions,
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but the treating physician's answers). In short, the questions asked by counsel did not
allow anticipation of the treating physician's voluntary causation testimony. {Id.) The
court then determined that a curative instruction was appropriate and gave such to the
jury, well before the treating physician's testimony had concluded. (R. 773 at 140-141,
R. 773 at 142-243) (containing the remainder of the treating physician's testimony).
The trial court concluded that, in order to be consistent with his ruling on the
motion in limine, statements in the medical records that the accident was causally
connected to the injuries must be redacted because those written statements also
constituted the treating physician's opinion testimony as to causation. (R. 773 at 145:1620.) In the trial court's words, "if [the treating physician] thinks [the accident] is causally
connected and he wrote in the record a causal statement, that still doesn't make it
admissible, because I've already ruled that he can't backdoor this opinion just because he
wrote it." (R. 773 at 137-138.) Statements as to treatment history, consistent with the
court's ruling, were not redacted.
In this case, Columbia Steel made timely objections to the treating physician's
testimony proffered in violation of the trial court's standing order, as Columbia Steel's
objections occurred while the treating physician was under direct examination. The
timeframe in which Columbia Steel made its objections known is in stark contrast with
those cases where the party either never voiced any objection or only objected a day after
the objectionable testimony was elicited. It was permissible for Columbia Steel to object
after the testimony was proffered as the questions that elicited the testimony were not in
themselves objectionable, but only the answers that volunteered prohibited opinion
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causation testimony. The court properly gave a curative instruction and properly
redacted the treating physician's records to be consistent with the prior ruling.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
ADMITTING THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF DR. PAUL FRANCE
BECAUSE HIS TESTIMONY WAS BASED ON REPORTS,
WRITINGS, AND OBSERVATIONS OF A TYPE REASONABLY
RELIED ON BY EXPERTS IN HIS FIELD.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the expert testimony of Dr.

Paul France because such testimony was based on reports, writings, and observations of a
type reasonably relied on by experts in the field of accident reconstruction. Trial courts
are afforded "wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony," and
an appellate court "will not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of
reasonability." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993).
The trial court properly evaluated and admitted Dr. France's testimony under the
standard set forth in State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 712 (Utah 1982) for experts using
established scientific principles or techniques. There are essentially two standards for the
admissibility of expert testimony in Utah courts and the nature of the expert's methods
will determine which standard a court should apply. See Balderas v. Starks, 138 P.3d 75,
82 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that expert testimony will be evaluated either under
an inherent reliability test or a general acceptance standard depending on whether it is
based on w*novel scientific principles or techniques.'*). The first standard, articulated in
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 338 (Utah 1989), uses a heightened "inherent reliability
test" for expert testimony and applies only where there is a "plausible claim'' that the
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testimony of a given expert is based on "novel scientific principles or techniques." Id.;
see also Green v. Louder, 29 P.3d 638, 645 (Utah 2001).
On the other hand, the second standard, outlined in State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 712
(Utah 1982), applies to all other cases where an expert is not using novel scientific
principles or techniques. Pursuant to the Clayton standard, a qualified expert "may base
his opinions on reports, writings[,] or observations . . . so long as they are of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in that particular field." Id. at 726. Where expert
testimony is admitted under Clayton, the opposing party "may challenge the suitability or
reliability of such materials [relied upon by the expert] on cross-examination, but such
challenge goes to the weight to be given the testimony, not to its admissibility." Clayton,
646 P.2d at 726.
As recently as last year, this Court made clear that the expert accident
reconstruction testimony of Dr. France is not subject to the heightened inherent reliabilitytest expressed in Rimmasch. In Balderas v. Starks,3 the court held that there was no
"'plausible claim' that the testimony of Dr. France was based on novel scientific
principles or techniques." 138 P.3d at 75, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). In fact, this Court
stated that the argument that Dr. France's testimony was based on novel techniques "is
essentially foreclosed by Green [v. Louder, 29 P.3d 638 (Utah 2001)], in which the Utah

3

It should be noted that the counsel for the Prunedas in this case and counsel for the
Appellants in Balderas are the same. Since Balderas was published in May 2006,
counsel for the Prunedas was undoubtedly aware, prior to filing the appeal brief in this
case in January 2007, of this Court's strong statements with respect to their previously
unpersuasive (and now recycled) arguments regarding Dr. France and the admissibility of
his testimony under Rimmasch,
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Supreme Court held that the testimony of an accident reconstructionist who, similar to
Dr. France, employed a computer program to perform mathematical computations, was
'certainly not based on novel scientific principles or techniques.'" Id. This Court then
went on to explain that "Green underscores that for decades, accident ^constructionists
employing techniques similar to those of Dr. France have been allowed to render expert
opinions." Id In conclusion, this Court stated that a court must "evaluate Dr. France's
testimony under the standard set forth in Clayton?' which is that an expert "witness may
base his opinions on reports, writings[,] or observations not in evidence which were made
or compiled by others, so long as they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
that particular field." Id,
Under the standard set forth in Clayton, Dr. France's testimony is clearly
admissible as it was drawn from materials reasonably relied upon by experts in his field.
In reaching his conclusions regarding the Prunedas' accident, Dr. France relied upon the
following: impact studies involving similar vehicles, results of three-vehicle crash tests
he personally performed, the traffic accident report prepared by the officer responding to
the accident, vehicle repair estimates, photographs of the Prunedas' vehicle and
Columbia Steel's vehicle after the accident, vehicle specifications from commercially
available databases, and deposition testimony of Sergio Pruneda, Richard Gray of
Columbia Steel, Elisha Archuleta and Victor Perez (whose vehicle was hit by the
Prunedas after they were rear-ended by Richard Gray). (R. 187; R. 778 at 34:4-10.) Dr.
France testified that the photographs showed damage not indicated in the repair
estimates, and, that he took into account the damage revealed in the photographs. (R. 778
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at 24-25.) Additionally, Dr. France made clear that he was able to ascertain the damage
to Mr. Perez's vehicle, which was in front of and hit by the Prunedas' vehicle, through
the detailed description of such damage provided by Mr. Perez in his deposition. (See id.;
see also R. 777 at 17-18.) After examining these materials, Dr. France reached his
conclusions regarding the accident by performing calculations using physics equations
involving kinematics of the vehicles, including speed, acceleration, distances, and
momentum. (R. 187) (Dr. France's Preliminary Investigation Report containing a
description of the methodology used). This methodology for calculating vehicle
kinematics is commonly used and accepted by accident reconstructionists. (R. 778 at
66:18-25.)
In the absence of Utah law supporting their position, the Prunedas unpersuasively
rely on Virginia case law, namely Tittsworth v. Robinson, 475 S.E.2d 261 (Va. 1996), to
support their contention that Dr. France's accident reconstruction testimony should have
been excluded. While touching on similar issues, Tittsworth is of no import in this case
given that this Court has already considered and disregarded it. See Balderas, 138 P.3d at
83 n.l 1. In deciding Balder as, this Court rejected Tittsworth, primarily because
"Tittsworth applied the standard for admissibility of experts under Virginia law, which is
different than that established by either State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, (Utah 1982), or
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)/' Id
Ultimately, the Prunedas * challenge to Dr. France's testimony relates only to
matters that affect the credibility, not the admissibility, of Dr. France's testimony as their
challenge attacks the suitability and sufficiency of the materials Dr. France considered
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while reconstructing the accident. In their challenge the Prunedas indicate that Dr.
France lacked repair estimates for a third car in the accident, the Nova, that there was
damage to their own car not described in their own repair estimates, and that Dr. France
had to estimate the vehicles' Delta V (change in speed) in order to determine the impact
speed and g forces involved in the accident. See Brief of Appellants' at 21-22. While
challenges regarding such are appropriate for cross-examination of an expert accident
reconstructionist, these challenges do not reveal any use of a novel scientific technique or
principle, nor do they change the fact that the Dr. France based his opinions on materials
reasonably relied on by other experts in the accident reconstruction field.4
Given that Dr. France based his opinions on materials reasonably relied upon by
accident reconstructionists, the trial court acted within its discretion by admitting Dr.
France's expert testimony in this case.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
ADMITTING THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF DR. JAYNE CLARK, A

4

Also these challenges to Dr. France's testimony were sufficiently rebuffed by Dr.
France himself. Dr. France explained that he was able to ascertain the damage to the
Nova by reviewing the detailed description of the damage given by Mr. Perez, the car's
owner, in Mr. Perez's deposition. (R. 777 at 17-18.) Likewise, Dr. France explained that
he was able to take into account damage to the Prunedas' LeBaron that was not described
in the repair estimate because that damage was evident in the photographs of the LeBaron
that Dr. France reviewed. (R. 778 at 24-25.) Finally, while Dr. France acknowledged
that he had to estimate the Delta V in order to determine the impact speed of the vehicles
in the accident (and in turn the force with which they struck each other), he explained that
he did not simply pick a number for the Delta V out of thin air. Instead, Dr. France ran
"iterative equations5' that compared all the known factual evidence (including damage to
the vehicles and barrier test data) to possible figures for Delta V. (R. 774 at 222:5224:8.) Through these equations Dr. France was able to determine which figure for Delta
V most accurately matched with the known factual evidence about the accident, the
vehicles, their damage, the distance they traveled, and barrier test data run on similar
cars. (R. 774 at 222:20-25.)
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PHYSIATRIST, REGARDING THE NECESSITY, PROPRIETY, AND
EXTENT OF MEDICAL CARE PROVIDED BY A CHIROPRACTOR
BECAUSE DR. CLARK IS KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT CARE FOR
SPINAL INJURIES.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the expert testimony of
physiatrist, Dr. Clark to testify as to the necessity, propriety, and extent of the medical
care provided to the Prunedas' by their chiropractor because Columbia Steel established
that Dr. Clark is knowledgeable about the standard of care and treatment required for
spinal problems. A practitioner of one school of medicine is not prohibited ;;as a matter
of law . . . [from] testify [ing] against a member of another school." Burton v.
Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985). Rather, all that Utah law requires for a trial
court to admit such testimony is that the party offering the witness lay a sufficient
foundation to "establish the witness' knowledge and familiarity with the standard of care
and treatment commonly practiced by physicians engaged in [a given] specialty." Martin
v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Greene v. Thomas, 662 P.2d
491, 493 (Colo. App. 1982)). Thus, a member of one school of medicine may testify as
to the treatment provided by a member of a different school when the "witness is
knowledgeable about the standard of care of another specialty or when the standards of
different specialties on the issue in a particular case are the same." Arnold v. Curtis, 846
P.2dl307, 1310 (Utah 1993).5

5

Additionally, in Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 67 P.2d 654 (Utah 1937), the Utah Supreme
Court held that a trial court had correctly allowed the testimony of a medical doctor in a
medical malpractice case against a chiropractor because the medical doctor was
competent and qualified to testify as he was familiar with the standard of care applicable
to the general practice of medicine in which the chiropractor had engaged.
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The Prunedas erroneously contend that Columbia Steel did not lay a sufficient
foundation to establish Dr. Clark's knowledge and familiarity with the type of care that
would be considered reasonable given the injuries at issue in this case. The following
facts controvert this contention. Prior to trial, Columbia Steel established that Dr. Clark
is knowledgeable as a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation, as well as being
board certified as a disability analyst and in physical therapy. (R. 730 at 5:11-16; see
also R. 129-135.) Dr. Clark also received fellowship training in spine care. See id. In
fact, her medical practice "mostly deal[s] with the neurologic and musculoskeletal
problems." (R. 730 at 7:3-4.) In her deposition, Dr. Clark testified that "the chiropractic
fields overlap both . . . [her] therapy as well as physical medicine and rehabilitation"
training and that she "practices all kinds of spine medicine and rehabilitation and
therapies," which make her "feel confident to testify as to the standard of care for spine
care problems, whether they're chiropractic or physical therapy, orthopedic or
rehabilitative medicine." (R. 730 at 8:12-21.)
Furthermore, Columbia Steel also established that Dr. Clark has specific
knowledge regarding certain guidelines relevant to chiropractors. Dr. Clark testified that
she was aware that the Utah Association of Chiropractic Physicians has adopted CAD
protocols as guidelines that give some ranges of treatment that are extremely broad. (R.
730 at 16:1-17:23.) Dr. Clark then explained that CAD protocols still remain a
recommendation or guideline, rather than a uniformly imposed standard that all
chiropractors must follow them. Id. Additionally, Dr. Clark testified that she knew that
standards were set forth for chiropractors by the division of Occupational and
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Professional Licensing. (R. 730 at 14:18-21, 15:1-17, 10:14-17, 16:17-20.)6 On their
part, the Prunedas did not present any evidence that CAD protocols are the standard of
care for chiropractic treatment in Utah, that CAD guidelines were the standard of care for
treatment of neck and back injuries, or that CAD protocols justified the voluminous
number of treatments that their chiropractor gave them.
The trial court properly determined that Columbia Steel laid a sufficient
foundation to establish Dr. Clark's knowledge regarding the reasonableness of care for
the Prunedas' alleged soft tissue neck and back injuries, regardless of whether that care
was provided by a chiropractor, a medical doctor, or a D.O. Dr. Clark is trained in spinal
medicine and rehabilitation and she practices all kinds of spine rehabilitation therapies.
This training and professional practice demonstrated Dr. Clark's knowledge of the
amount of care necessary for rehabilitation of soft tissue injuries, such as those alleged in
this case. More specifically, this demonstrates her ability to judge when treatment for
such injuries is needed and when it is excessive. Since Dr. Clark was not called on to
testify as to any matters of chiropractor malpractice, but rather the extent and necessity of
soft tissue spine treatment offered, her knowledge more than qualified her. As a result,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting her testimony as to the extent,

6

Additionally, the Prunedas' criticism that Dr. Clark did not independently examine them
is disingenuous. Dr. Clark explained that the Prunedas were asked to come in for an IME
with her, but were reluctant to do so. (R. 730 at 22:4-17: R. 775 at 33:13-34:4.)
Subsequent to her request that Mr. Pruneda return to Utah for an IME, Mr. Pruneda
reported that he had no ongoing problems or pain and did not want to ha\e to return to
Utah from California. (R. 730 at 22:19-23:2.) The Pruneda children had already been
defined by their chiropractor as having reached maximum medical improvement and
lacking symptoms, so the attorney's agreed there was no reason to see them. (Id.)
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propriety, and necessity of the treatment given by the Prunedas' chiropractor for the
Prunedas' spine related injuries.
CONCLUSION
This court should affirm the trial court's judgment. Utah law clearly precludes the
Prunedas from challenging a jury instruction that they themselves proposed or special
verdict form to which they stipulated. Furthermore, the jury7 instruction as proposed was
proper as a jury need not award general damages to a party injured in a car accident, even
where the injured party's medical expenses exceed a personal injury protection threshold,
where the jury finds the complaints of damage to be subjective or the credibility of the
injured party questionable. Finally, the trial court acted well within its discretion by
admitting the expert testimony of Dr. France and Dr. Clark and by excluding the
testimony of Dr. McLean, the Prunedas' treating physician, on the issue of causation.
Respectfully submitted this 28™ day of March, 2007.

STRONG & H

*/

By:

lobert L. Janicki
Peter H. Christensen
Heather Waite-Grover
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
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ADDENDUM
1. Plaintiffs'/Appellants' Proposed Jury Instruction on Damages
2. Jury Instruction on Damages
3. Trial Court's Oral Decision on the Prunedas' Request to Submit a Revised
Instruction on Damages to the Jury
4. Trial Court's Oral Decision on Columbia Steel's Motion in Limine to Exclude the
Prunedas' Treating Physician, Dr. McLean,
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Edward T. Wells (Bar No. 3422)
Matthew G. Cooper (Bar No. 5268)
5282 South Commerce Drive, #D-292
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801)284-7278

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH

SERGIO PRUNEDA,
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 030402552
vs.

Judge Fred D. Howard

COLUMBIA STEEL CASTING CO.,
INC., an Oregon corporation, and
RICHARD D. GRAY,
Defendants.
Comes now plaintiff and requests the court to give to the jury in the above case the attached
instructions numbered 1 through 25, in addition to any stock instructions the court may have
provided to counsel.
Dated this 24th day of March, 2006

/?/I
Edward T.Wells

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of March, 2006,1 caused to be mailed
by first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS to
Steven T. Densley
Strong & Hanni
3 Triad Center, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180

2

INSTRUCTION NO.

/

The evidence in the case will consist of the sworn testimony of the witnesses,
regardless of who may have called them; all exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may
have introduced them; and all facts which may have been judicially noticed, and which I instmct
you to take as true for the purposes of this case.
Depositions may also be received in evidence. Depositions contain swom
testimony, with the lawyer for each party being entitled to ask questions. Testimony provided in
a deposition may be read to you in open court or may be seen on a video monitor. Deposition
testimony is to be considered by you, subject to the same instructions which apply to witnesses
testifying in open court.
Statements and arguments of lawyers are not evidence in the case, unless made as
an admission or stipulation of fact. When the lawyers on both sides stipulate or agree to the
existence of a fact, you must, unless otherwise instructed, accept the stipulation as evidence, and
regard that fact as proved.
I may take judicial notice of certain facts. When I declare that 1 will take judicial
notice of some fact, you must accept that fact as true.
Any evidence as to which I sustain an objection, and any evidence I order to be
stricken, must be entirely disregarded.
x^jiything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence, and
must be entirely disregarded.

3

INSTRUCTION NO.

2—

After the evidence has been heard and arguments and instructions are concluded,
you will retire to consider the evidence and arrive at your verdict. You will determine the facts
from all the testimony you hear and the other evidence that is received. You are the sole judges
of the facts. Neither I nor anyone else may invade your responsibility to act as judges of the
facts.
On the other hand, and with equal emphasis, I instruct you that >ou are bound to
accept the rules of law that I give you whether you agree with them or not.

References:
JEFUNo. 1.1 (1957)
Fed. Jury Prac. & Instructions § 70.06 (1987). Reprinted with permission;
copyright © 1987 West Publishing Company
MUJI1.5

4

INSTRUCTION NO.J)
This case must be decided only upon the evidence which you have heard from the
witnesses, and have seen in the form of documents, photographs or other tangible things admitted
into evidence.
Anything you may have seen or heard from any other source may not be
considered by you in arriving at your verdict.
You should not consider as evidence any statement of the lawyers made during
trial.

References'.
JEFU No. 3.6(1957)
MUJI2.4

5

INSTRUCTION NO.

^
—1

Your attitude and conduct at the outset of your deliberations is very important. It
will not be productive for any of you, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic
expression of your opinion on the case, or to announce a determination to stand for a certain
verdict. When that happens, your sense of pride may be aroused and you may hesitate to recede
from an announced position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans
or advocates in this matter, but are judges. Your deliberations in the jury room are for the
ascertainment and declaration of the truth and the administration of justice.
References:
JIFUNo. 1.8(1957)
MUJI2.7

6

INSTRUCTION NO. 5
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of
the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, you have a
right to take into consideration any biases, any interest in the result, and any motive or lack of
motive to testify fairly. You may consider the witnesses' conduct while testifying before you, the
reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, their
opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should
consider these matters you believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the
witnesses' statements.

References'.
JIFU No. 3.2(1957)
MUJI2.9
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INSTRUCTION NO. _L
You may believe that a witness, on some former occasion, made statements
inconsistent with that witness' testimony given here in this case.
That does not necessarily mean that you are required to entirely disregard the
present testimony. The effect of such evidence upon the credibility of the witness is for you to
determine.

References'.
JIFUNos. 3.10, 3.11 (1957)
MUJI2.10

8

INSTRUCTION NO.

3=-

In the present action, certain testimony has been read to you by way of deposition.
You are not to discount this testimony for the sole reason that it comes to you in the form of a
deposition. It is entitled to the same consideration as if the witness had personally appeared.

References:
JIFU No. 3.3(1957)
MUJI2.12

9

INSTRUCTION NO. V)
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinions of a witness to be
received as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses
who, by education, study and experience, have become expert in some art, science, profession or
calling, may state opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an expert,
so long as it is material and relevant to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and the
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight you think it
deserves. If you should decide that the opinions of an expert witness are not based upon
sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support
of the opinions are not sound, or that such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may
disregard the opinion entirely.

References:
JIFU No. 3.7(1957)
Fed. Jury Prac. & Instructions § 72.08 (1987 & Supp. 1991). Reprinted with permission;
copyright © 1987 West Publishing Company
MUJI2.14

10

INSTRUCTION NO. Y
Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the burden of proof rests upon a
certain pany, or that a party must prove a certain proposition, or that you must find a certain
proposition to be true, I mean that unless the truth of the allegation is proved by a preponderance
of the evidence, you shall find that the same is not true.

References'
JIFUNo. 2.1 (1957)
MUJI2.16

11

INSTRUCTION NO.

jQ

The term "preponderance of the evidence" means that evidence which, in your
minds, seems to be of the greater weight; the most convincing and satisfactory. The
preponderance of the evidence is not determined by the number of witnesses, nor the amount of
the testimony, but by the convincing character of the testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and
honestly by you. If the evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force on any allegation,
you must find that such allegation has not been proved.

References'.
JFUNo.3.1 (1957)
MUJI2.18

12

INSTRUCTION NO. )f
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view
to reaching an agreement, if your individual judgment allows such agreement. You each must
decide the case for yourself, but only after consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You
should not hesitate to change an opinion when convinced that it is wrong. However, you should
not surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect or weight of evidence for the mere
purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the opinion of the other jurors.

References'.
JDFUNo. 1.7(1957)
MUJI2.25

13

INSTRUCTION NO. \2*~It is your duty to make findings of fact as to the questions I will submit to you. In
making your findings of fact, you should bear in mind that the burden of proving any disputed
fact rests upon the party claiming the fact to be true, and that fact must be proved by [a
preponderance of the evidence] [clear and convincing evidence].
This is a civil action and six members of the jury may find and return a verdict. At
least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be the same six on
each question. As soon as six or more of you ha\e agreed on the answer to each question, have
the verdict signed and dated by your foreperson and then return it to this room.

References'.
JDFUNo. 1.10(1957)
MUJI2.27
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INSTRUCTION NO.

jj

Upon retiring to the jury room you will select one of you to act as foreperson, who
will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you agree. The foreperson
should not dominate the jury, but the foreperson's opinion should be given the same weight as the
opinions of the other members of the jury.

References'.
JIFUNo. 1.9(1957)
MUJI2.28
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INSTRUCTION NO.

j^f

In this case the plaintiffs claim the defendant was negligent in one or more of the
following respects:
A.

Defendant failed to keep a proper lookout and while driving on a

public highway and collided with the vehicle of plaintiff who was lawfully stopped to avoid
colliding with a vehicle in front of him.
B.

Defendant failed to keep his vehicle under proper control while

driving on a public highway and collided with the vehicle of plaintiff who was lawfully stopped
to avoid colliding with a vehicle in front of him.
B.

Defendant drove his vehicle into the vehicle occupied by the

plaintiff who was lawfully stopped to avoid colliding with a vehicle in front of him.
To return a verdict for the plaintiffs, you must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that:
1.

The defendant was negligent in one or more of the particulars

alleged by the plaintiff; and
2.

The defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs'

injuries.
If you find in favor of the plaintiffs on any one of the three questions, you must
then decide the amount of the damages suffered by the plaintiff.

References:
JTFU No. 2.4(1957)
MUJI3.1(Modified)
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INSTRUCTION NO.

lb

A person has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring other people or
property. "Negligence" simply means the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care does
not require extraordinary caution or exceptional skill. Reasonable care is what an ordinary,
prudent person uses in similar situations.
The amount of care that is considered "reasonable" depends on the situation. You
must decide what a prudent person with similar knowledge would do in a similar situation.
Negligence may arise in acting or in failing to act.
A party whose injuries or damages are caused by another party's negligent conduct
may recover compensation from the negligent party for those injuries or damages.

References:
Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985)
Meese v. Brigham Young Univ., 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981)
Covert v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 23 Utah 2d 252, 461 P.2d 466 (1969)
Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964)
JIFUNos. 15.1,15.2, 15.3,15.4(1957)
BAJINos. 3.00(1986), 3.10 (1986), 3.11 (Supp. 1992), 3.12 (Supp. 1992).
Reprinted with permission; copyright © 1986 West Publishing Company
MUJI3.2
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INSTRUCTION NO. ( f0
A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, produces the injur/' and without which the injury would not have occurred. A
proximate cause is one which sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury.

References:
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985)
Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985)
Skollingsberg v. Brookover, 26 Utah 2d 45, 484 P.2d 1177 (1971)
Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 (1966)
JIFUNo. 15.6(1957)
BAJI No. 3.75 (1986). Reprinted with permission; copyright © 1986 West Publishing Company
MUJI3.13

18

INSTRUCTION NO. / 7
The driver of any vehicle has the duty to exercise reasonable care at all times to
avoid placing others in danger.

References;
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984)
BAJI No. 5.00 (1986). Reprinted with permission; copyright © 1986 West Pubhshing Company
MUJI5.1

19

INSTRUCTION NO. 1

£

The driver of any vehicle has the duty to use reasonable care to avoid danger.
In that regard, every driver is required:
1.

To keep a lookout for other vehicles and highway conditions that

reasonably may be anticipated.
2.

To keep the vehicle under proper control.

3.

To follow another vehicle at a safe distance, with proper regard for

both vehicles' speed, other traffic, and highway conditions.
4.

To control his vehicle so as to avoid colliding with other vehicles upon

the roadway.
References:
MUJI5.4
Jorgensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80 (Utah Ct. App. 19S7;

INSTRUCTION NO.

j?

The law provides that any person driving a motor vehicle on a public roadway
shall keep a proper lookout. A "proper lookout" means maintaining the lookout that an ordinarily
careflil person would use in light of all conditions existing at the time and those reasonably to be
anticipated.
A "proper lookout" includes a duty to see objects and conditions in plain sight, to
see that which is open and apparent and to realize obvious dangers. This duty does not merely
require looking, but also requires observing and understanding other traffic and the general
situation.

References:

Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170 (Utah 1983)
Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975)
Wardell v. Jerman, 18 Utah 2d 359, 423 P.2d 485 (1967)

MUJI5.14(modified)

21

INSTRUCTION NO. ~2&

It is the duty of every person using in a public roadway, whether as a pedestrian or
as a driver of a vehicle, to exercise reasonable care at all times to avoid placing oneself or others
in danger, and to use reasonable care to avoid causing; an accident.

References:
Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680 (1954)
Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P.2d495 (1949)
JIFUNo. 20.1 (1957)
BAJI No. 5.50 (Supp. 1992). Reprinted with permission; copyright © 1986 West Publishing
Company
MUJI 5.21 (modified)

INSTRUCTION NO. 2 -

If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, then it is
your duty to award the plaintiff such damages, if any, that you find, from a preponderance of the
evidence, will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for the injury and damage sustained.

References:
JIFUNo. 90.1 (1957)
MUJI27.1
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ADDENDUM 2

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

JURY INSTRUCTION #

1

OPENING INTRODUCTION - NATURE OF CASE, GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Members of the jury, we are about to begin the trial of this case. You have heard some
details about this case during the process of jury selection. Before the trial begins, however, there
are certain instructions you should have to better understand what will be presented to you and how
you should conduct yourself during the trial.
The parties who bring a lawsuit are called the plaintiffs. In this action the plaintiffs are
Sergio Pruneda, Iris Pruneda, Anthony Guerrero, Donovan Guerrero, Sergio Pruneda, Jr., Cozy
Pruneda, Matthew Pruneda, and Zennia Pruneda. The parties against whom the suit is brought are
called the defendants. In this action the defendants are Columbia Steel Casting Company, Inc., and
Richard D. Gray.
The plaintiffs seek recovery for general, compensatory, and special damages arising from an
automobile accident. The defendants deny the plaintiffs7 claims.
By your verdict, you will decide disputed issues of fact. I will decide all questions of law that
arise during the trial. Before you retire to deliberate at the close of the case, I will instruct you on
the law that you must follow and apply in deciding your verdict.
Since you will be called upon to decide the facts of this case, you should give careful
attention to the testimony and evidence presented for your consideration, bearing in mind that I will
instruct you at the end of the trial concerning the manner in which you should determine the
credibility or "believability" of each witness and the weight to be given the testimony. During the

INSTRUCTION NO

37

If you find the issues m favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, then it is your
duty to award the plaintiff such damages, if any, that you find, from a preponderance of the
evidence, will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for the injury and damage sustained

INSTRUCTION NO. 3 8
In awarding such damages, you may consider any pain, discomfort, and suffering, both
mental and physical, its probable duration and severity, and the extent to which the plaintiff has
been prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as previously enjoyed. You may also
consider whether any of the above will, with reasonable certainty, continue in the future. If so,
you may award such damages as will fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for them.
No definite standard or method of calculation is prescribed by law to fix reasonable
compensation for pain and suffering. Nor is the opinion of any witness required as to the amount
of such reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the argument of counsel as to the amount of
damages is not evidence of reasonable compensation. In making an award for pain and suffering,
you shall exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the damages you fix
shall be just and reasonable in light of the evidence.

INSTRUCTION #

^

You are instructed that the laws of the state of Utah provide that there can be no award of
general damages unless there is an award of medical expenses exceeding S3 000 andyor a finding of
permanent disability or permanent impairment.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^O

In awarding such damages, you may consider the reasonable value of medical care,
services and supplies reasonably required and actually given in the treatment of the plaintiffs and
the reasonable value of similar items that more probably than not will be required and given m
the future.

INSTRUCTION NO. H\
In awarding such damages, you may consider the reasonable value of working time lost to
date. In determining this amount, you should consider (1) evidence of the plaintiffs earning
capacity; (2) earnings; (3) how the plaintiff ordinarily was occupied; and (4) what the plaintiff
was reasonably likely to have earned in the time lost if the plaintiff had not been injured.

INSTRUCTION #

4 2

It is the duty of a person who has been injured to use reasonable diligence m caring for the
injuries and reasonable means to prevent their aggravation and to accomplish healing
When an injured person does not use reasonable diligence to care for the injuries, and they
are aggravated as a result of such failure, the liability, if any, of another whose act or omission was
a proximate cause of the original injury must be limited to the amount of damage that would have
been suffered if the injured person had exercised the required diligence

INSTRUCTION #

^

The fact that I have instructed you concerning damages is not to be taken as an indication that
I either believe or do not believe that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover such damages. The
instructions in reference to damages are given as a guide in case you find from a preponderance of
the evidence that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover. However, if you determine that there should
be no recovery, then you will entirely disregard the instructions given you upon the matter of
damages.

ADDENDUM 3

1

MS. ATWOOD:

2

THE COURT:

3

Was that your verdict,

Mr. Bunnell?

4

MR. BUNNELL:

5

THE COURT:

6

Yes, Your Honor.

Yes, sir.
And was that your verdict,

Ms. Willmore ?

7

MS. WILLMORE:

8

MR. WELLS:

9

Yes, sir.

Your Honor, we have one problem.

that we need to address.

10

THE COURT:

Yes.

Could you approach?

11

MR. WELLS:

Having awarded the

12

damages, they can't award a zero.

13

that --

14

MR. CHRISTENSEM:

15

MR. WELLS:

They cannot award general damages

of zero.

17

to be more than a nominal amount.

18

prepared.

20

They have to award general damages and it has

22

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

25

instruction

that?
MR. WELLS:

24

come

Why didn't you prepare a verdict

21

23

I've

You'll have to send them back out.
THE COURT:

to suggest

There's case law on

They can't award what?

16

19

special

Because it never

—

They don't have to

(inaudible ) .
THE COURT:

You've written this verdict,

you've stipulated to it.

I'd have to reprint this

1

verdict .

2

MR. WELLS:

No.

The verdict: is what it is.

3

Ii has a provision for general damages, and they have to

4

award some.

5

MR. CKRISTENSEN:

6

MR. WELLS:

Case law.

7

THE COURT:

I'll hear an argument for a few

8

minutes.

They have io

(inaudible).

I'll excuse them and I'll hear this argument.

9

MR. WELLS:

Okay.

10

THE COURT:

Counsel wish to address an

11

argument that may affect the verdict; .

12

any further delay.

13

us for a few moments longer.

14

jury room.

I apologize for

I'll ask if you'll be patient with
May I excuse you to the

It shouldn't take long.

15

BAILIFF:

All rise for the jury.

16

THE COURT:

17

Please be seated.

Just give me a moment, please.
Your argument, Mr. Wells

18

that concerned our bench conference, I assume applied to

19

Sergio?

20

MR. WELLS:

It applies to Sergio.

21

THE COURT:

And Sergio only?

22

MR. WELLS:

He's the only one with damages

23
24
25

over tnreshold.
THE COURT:
some general damages.

And you claim they have to award

1

MR. WELLS:

They have to award general

damages

2

and it has to oe an amount that's more than a nominal

3

amount.

I have an instruction that I would -THE COURT:

4

Is there a reason why you didn't

5

present an instruction, and why you didn't craft the

6

verdict to reflect tnis need?
MR. WELLS:

7
8

It tells them to award general damages.
THE COURT:

9
10

Because the verdict is what it is.

Why are you asking for an

instruction, then?
MR. WELLS:

Well, because they have made an

13

THE COURT:

How would they

14

MR. WELLS:

Because the Court's going to tell

THE COURT:

No.

11
12

15

error.
know?

them .

16

My question is if you think

17

this is an error and they should have been

13

why did you not present an instruction?

19

presented this instruction you 1 re
MR. WELLS:

20
21
22
23
24

instructed,

You never

seeking.

They are instructed.

instructed that if -- that they're to award

They're
general

lamag;
THE COURT:

What is the instruction that vc1

seek that you could not hav<r P

n ""• P s P n t

P

'

I don't understand wny you didn't present i:

MR.

WEJJLS

:

Because in doesn't become an issue

2

until they award special damages over the threshold and

3

then do not award general damages.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

4
5

Can I address this, Your

Honor?
THE COURT:

6

Well, I believe I've

read a case

7

on this, and it could be something even as much as a

8

dollar.

9
10

Isn't it -- isn't that the authority on it?
MR. WELLS:

I think they have to award more

than nominal damages.

11

THE COURT:

I don't recall that one.

12

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

That's completely wrong,

13

Your Honor.

First off, I think if counsel wanted them

14

instructed on that, there should have been a jury

15

instruction.

16

to the questions

17

and -- 6A and 6B the way ir reads, which gives them the

18

option if they award more than $3,0G0 to put nothing

19

down for general damages.

20

awarded if it was over $3,COO, he could have very easily

21

crafted the question and tell them that.

And secondly, he shouldn't have

stipulated

6A and 63 the way -- excuse me, 6B

If something had to be

22

And secondly, I know if it's going to be a

23

general damage, they can award as little as a dollar

24

because I have had specific questions

25

jurors saying, Can we give them, you know, a cc

come out from
;= - 9

And the response has been, You can only give them a
2

dollar in general damages if you give them specials.

3 I You can': gee ro generals unless you have some specials.
And so the long and short of it is this jury
is going to be instructed that they have to give an
6 I amount, which I don T t think they should be instructed.
7 ] He had his opportunity to instruct them, but if the
8 1 Court is so inclined to give that instruction, then that
9 I instruction has to include that they can give as little
10 i as a dollar.
11

THE COURT:

I believe that's fair.

12|

MR. WEILS:

13 |

THE COURT:

My biggest concern is waiver.

14

MR. WELLS:

Well, I think -- I can't cite Your

(Inaudible.)

15

Honor to the case right now, but I think there's a case

16

that says they have to award generals if they award

17

specials.

18

jurisdiction, from other jurisdictions, where they have

19

a statutory minimum such as the $3,000 we have here that

20

say, in effect -- I think m

21

is, we have a threshold to make a determination

22

not serious cases and serious cases.

23

are appropriate only in cases where they find

24

but no damage, that's when nominal damages are
approoriate

And there is case law, not from this

effect what they're

Nominal

>0

saying
between

damages
liability

c: ^ ^ c; o

T-

^ p +-

we're over the threshold and then award
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

nominally.

Your Honor, to say -- to

come here in front of the Court at this point and say I
think there's a case and to say I think the real
authority is outside the state is insufficient.

If he

thought this was going to be a problem, he should have
come with the authority and informed the Court of that
beforehand

and not stipulated to this jury instruction.
His conduct in stipulating to this special

verdict led us to where we are at right now, and I am
not aware of any case authority that says they cannot
just give specials.
THE COURT:

Do you wish to stipulate to an

instruction and to have the jury directed as to question
63?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. CHRISTENSEN:
THE COURT:

No, I don't.

(Inaudible.)

I can't do it.

I'll tell you,

Mr. Wells, I believe I read such a case about the award
of general damages

following

specials, but I think your

THE COURT:

You stioulated to this verdict

MR. WELLS:

And I think the form is entirely

norm.

correcc, and I think when the jury comes in and awards
special damages of zero, than that T s an error and the
6

Court should send them out again, but I'll

7

THE COURT:

Well, in my opinion, the language

8

that includes

9

of zero, and that's my
Z fT

10

submit it.

"if any you award," encompasses the award
interpretation.

er you preserve the record as

11

Mr. Christensen has suggested and presented

12

(inaudible).

13

Please escort the jury.

14

BAILIFF:

15

THE COURT:

authority

All rise for the jury.
Please be seated.

Thank you,

16

ladies and gentlemen, for your continued patience.

17

have no further business to conduct.

13

conclude now.

19

service.

20

have been attentive and you are to be commended.

21

appreciate your service.

We

We are -- we can

And I wish to, again, thank you for your

I know it's been a taxing business but you

evening.

We

We hope you have a pleasant

Ycu are excused at this time and you are at
talk to whomever you wish about this case, if

^
cr.ocse

z:

-o

Quite frankly, the lawyers may wish to

ADDENDUM 4

PRUNEDA v. COLUMBIA STEEL CASTING CO., INC.
April I"7, 2CC6 St April 18, 2CC6
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAI

1

MR. WELLS:

i understand.

2

THE COURT:

—possibilities, I guess.

3

right.

Thau covers your morion?

4

MR. WELLS:

5

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

6
7
8
9
10
II

All

clarification?

Yes.

The second—
Well, may I just have a

So what is y o u r —

THE COURT:

Last night's matter doesn't seem to

pertain to this business.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Correct.

Thau's fine.

I

will stipulate—
THE COURT:

It's excluded uncer 403, unless

12

your testimony—examination would suggest something

13

else, whereupon you will notify me.

14

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

15

THE COURT:

Anything else?

16

MR. WELLS:

Secondly, Your Honor, I'd like a

17

little bit of a clarification.

18

motion in limine yesterday regarding Dr. McClean as an

19

expert witness.

20

motion came at a late time and I really haven't had time

21

to sit and think about it and to look at it.

22

Correct.

We talked about his

That--as I told you yesterday, that

I did pull the comments that I read to the

23

Court yesterday.

But in looking au it again briefly

24

last night, it doesn't appear to me than the cases ciued

25

bv the defense have anvthina to do with the narrow issue

nzi^^T;

PRUNEDA v. COLUMBIA STEEL CASTING CO., INC.
April 17, 2006 & April IS, 2005
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAI

we T re taZ.king about here.

They generally talk abou t

when you don 't provide the information that Rule 2 6
requires.

Bu t if you look at subpart A and subpart

B

'

it' s clear th at subpart A talks about you have to
identify any person who is going to give testimony under
Rules 702, 3 and 4.

They ail have to be identified and

the ident—
THE COURT:

Let me interrupt you and tell you

the basis of my ruling, and then you can tell me wh at
you f re concerned about.
My understanding and belief is that:—you' "^e
probably corr ect that you need not submit a report on a
treating phys ician that has treated for h i s — w h a t w as
the language of your designation?

Treatment and

something?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

He actually had no

designation—
THE COURT:

No, he said the language.

MR. WELLS:

1 just said that he was the

treating phys ician and he was going to testify rega r d m g
his care and treatment.
THE COURT:

Care and treatment.

testify about: care and treatment.

He would

But causation is --is

something j noi what ordinarily—ordinarily net what
-ting physician would testify about.

- expect

8

1

PRUNEDA v. COLUMBIA S:
April 17, 2C06 Sc April IS, 2006

-—-—J

^~

.^STINC

, INC.
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIJ

1

causation is an expertise relating the inju ry to the

2

accident and I'd expect some designation on that.

3

that was the oasis of my opinion, plus your designation

4

1 limits that notice to care and treatment:.

So

So based on

5

that, I made the decision I would not allow him to

6

testify as to causation, but I would allow him to
testify as to care and treatment.
MR. WELLS:

9

All right.

And so in reviewing his

medical recor ds last night and in checking today, he

10

said, right in the records, that he is trea ting them for

11

injuries they received in this automobile a ccident.

12

I believe he's able to testify to that.

13

It' s m

the records.

So

They have the records.

14

They deposed him and had an opportunity to inquire as to

15

the basis for the statements in his records that this

16

treatment was related to injuries received in the

17

automobile accident.

18

THE COURT:

19
20
21
22

And so for that reason—
How would that advise them that his

opinion is to causation?
MR. WELLS:

Well, what is an opin ion?

If he

says, "I'm tr eating them"—
THE COURT:

Opinion is the doctor stating, Yes,

23

in my opinion , these injuries are causally

24

this accident , they were caused by this aceidem .
MR. WELLS:

I understand that.

rornop^QQ

tO

April I1r

FRUNEDA v. COLUMBIA STEEL CASTING CO., INC.
1^06 & April IS, 2CC6
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL

THE COURT

T h a t f s an op 1

MR.. WELLS

And t h a t ' s — and that's the opinion

-n i r\

n.

than — e v e r v doctor gives in every case that I hav e ever
been

—

dvea

I treate Q

L.iC m

-ii

30

y e a r s — p l u s y e a r s , they al 1 say,

for these

THE COURT :

injuries and in my opini o n —

I donf t h a v e any o p — I don' t have

any p r o b lem w ith th em doing it if you ! ve advised them
a notice

The prob lem I have is p n o r
MR. WEuLS :

Kono

•y

m

notice.

Well, and I--what I'm sayin g, Your

s we gave t hem the n o t i c e that is require d in

the s t a t u t e .
THE COURT :

Well—

MR. WELLS :

Because all tne statute savrs we

have to tell t h e m — unless they are an expert retained, I
don T t ha ve to teii them what

opini oris he's

going to

give , unless they a re a specially reta ined expert under
B.

And if you look at B —
THE COURT :

argu ment

j_

We're having thi s circular

don T t think h e — I mea n, y ou ' re telling

him— -tel ling me you didn't

retain him for that pt^rpose,

but you didn 't noti ce them that th at w as the opir.ion
that — h i s opinicn w culd e n c o m p a s s c a u s a t i o n .
THE COURT
ycu

No, I'm tell

didn ' t retain him at a l l .
THE

^ w u r\ - :

Right.

(Z ZX ^< r" ~ 3,

r-s r*

, what

I f m telling

PRUNZDA v. COLUMBIA STE],L CASTING C C , INC.
April 17, 20C6 5 April 13, 20C6
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIA.L

MR. W^LLS:

He is "che treating doctor and he is

going to give opinions—
3

6

THE COURT:

Okay, w h a t —

MR. WELLS:

—under s e v e n —

THE COURT:

But you didn't notice them about

that opinion.
MR. WELLS:

7

And that—no.

But what I'm saying

8

to Your Honor is I don't have to tell them what opinions

9

he is going to give unless he is especially retained

10
11
12

under B.

And that's what that comment—
THE COURT:

But you gave them the notice.

gave them the notice as to trie opinion.

13

MR. WELLS:

No, I didn't.

14

THE COURT:

I read it.

15

MR. WELLS:

I said he's going to g i v e —

16

THE COURT:

Give me your document.

17

MR. WELLS:

Where are t h e —

18

THE COURT:

Okay.

The document that I'm

19

reading from is the expert witness disclosure by

20

Mr. Wells dated July 12th m

21
22
23

You

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

wnich it s a y s —
Just a moment.

Let me get my

copy here.
THE COURT:

You can look at the Court's.

24

"Plaintiff herebv designates the fcllowma oerscns who

25

are expected to giv

sessional opinion testimony at

PRUNEDA v. COLUMBIA STEEL CASTING CO., INC.
Aoril 17, 2006 & April 13, 2006
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIA1

tria 1 regard!ng the care and treatment of plaintiffs for
inju ries received in the automobile accide nt which is at
, issue herein. ??

causation.

MR. WELLS:

That is correct.

THE COURT:

I interpret that not to include

I don' t know how that would notify—
MR. WELLS:

Yeah.

I'm trying to --I'm trying to

avoi d what I think is a reversible error, Your Honor.
What ITm saying is the contemplation of A is meant to

cove r treating physi cians.

And all y o u — i f you read

that comment, it say s—let me get it again

Where's

that comment that I- -and these are comment s to the
f ederal rules , Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. WELLS:

And I've got a copy, Your Honor.

And what it s ays — it is discussing, of course, the two
subp aragraphs of the rule.

The first one requires—and

you can follow along in the state rule, be cause it's
basi cally the same.
The first paragraph A says that you have —

mome nr.

THE COURT:

This is to rule what ?

MR. WELLS:

It's Rule 26 (a)—it' s 26 (a)--just a

ItTs 26(a) (2), disclosure of expert testimony.

And subparagr aph (a) basically says that w e have to
disc lose nhe ilentit y of any person who may be used at

!
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1

trial to prese nt evidence under Ru le -702, 7C3, et

2

cetera.

3

We have told t hem we're going to c all the doct or and

New. that's what this nor.ice is meant to do.

heT s going to give evidence under- -give e xpert opinion
i under those ru les .
Then the subparagraph th at we'r e talking about
j s a y s — w h i c h is the next o n e — s a y s , "Excep t as otherwise
stipulated or directed by the Cour t, this disc losure
9

shall" —
THE COURT:

10
11

from.

I don't know- where you' re reading

Are you under (a) (2) ?
MR. WELLS:

12

I think they 're numbered different

Let m e — l e t me sh ow the Court , because

13

in the federal

14

we put in all these exemptions (in audible ) expert

15

testimony.

16

ItT s

(a) (3) , excuse m e . And yo u look at A, and

17

(a) (3) (A) says you have to disclos e the i denti ty of

18

anyone who is going to give testimony und er th ose rules,

19

the evidence r*ules on expert opini ons .

20

TherL you look at E, and 3 says that with

21

respect to a p^erscn who is special iy reta ined or who is

22

an employee of a company whose job is to provi de expert,

23

you have to gi ve a report.

Now, t he repc rt is only

required from a subgroup of those who are requ ired to be
identified as people giving information under 702

/XL
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So you've got the wide group, anybody thatTs
going to give opinion has to be identified as someone
who will give opinions.

Then within that you have a

subgroup and it says anyone who is specially retained
3

for the litigation, solely for the purpose of giving

6

opinions for that litigation, has no give a report.
Now, that's what this comment is all about.

7
8

And the comment says the requirement of a written

9

report, in subparagraph (2)(B)—and in the Utah rules it

10

would be (3) (3)—applies only to those experts who are

11

retained or specially employed to provide such testimony

12

in the case or whose duties as an employee of a party

13

regularly involved m

14

That's the subgroup.

the giving of such testimony.

And then they specifically exclude physicians

15
16

from the subgroup by saying a treating physician, for

17

example, can be deposed—which they did—or called to

18

testify at trial without any requirement for a written

19

report.

20

are, because they have the right to depose him, he's the

21

doctor.

22

So we don't have to tell them what his opinions

Everybody that's ever been in one of these

23

cases, and their law firm's been doing it longer than

24

I've been alive, I think, they always know—they always

25

know that the doctor is going to be asked the question:

AD:
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"Do you have an opinion as to whether or not these
injuries are related to
every single case.

LiiaL

accident?"

It

h a p p e n s in

That 1 s why t h i s c o m m e n t is t h e re, is

1 10 avoid the expense to the p l a i n t i f f of h a v i n g to pay
the treating doctors to do a R u l e 2 6 r e p o r t .

They ' ve

specifically excluded it •
All we have to tel 1 t h e m , u n d e r A, is th at the
j doctor is going to give opin i o n s , and t h e n it's up to
them to take the deposit ion.

9

And so based upon t h a t , I h a v e n e v e r h a d a

11

court tell me that what that - - d i s c l o s u r e t h a t I m a de is

12
!

not a—that T s the exact same t h i n g I've b e e n d o i n g in

14

cases since t hese rules came o u t .

15

court tell me that my do ctor c o u l d not o p i n e on

16

causation.

17

ask

him what opin ions he has on t h a t r e g a r d .

10

13

A n d w h e n they d o , to

THE COURT:

Ok ay.

This

And

I've

is t h e

n e v e r ]lad a

question

I

18

have—I understand that, and w h i l e t h a t may b e t h e case

19

of what you s ay, i don't know if that authority explains

20

what yourre thinking.

21

The concern I have is t h e — I don't k n o w *tfhat

22

the authoriti es are . i don f t k n o w of any o t h e r

23

authorities.

I can understa nd w h y the rule w o u l d

exclude treat m g physic!a n s , b e c a u s e g e n e r a l l y t h e ir
treatment is treatment a nd t hey a r e n ' t i n v o l v e d in

46
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op in ions abou t

(inaudible) causation ge neraily, they are
So Z don't know if the exclusion

invo Ived in t reatment.

is simply for purposes of treatment.
But causation re ally doesn't relate to
trea tment

Ta. heir

•

opinion about causati on doesn't relate

to t reaiment.

And I know of many doctc rs who refuse to

i give causation

o p i n i o n s — t reating physi scans who refuse

to g ive causation opinions •
9

MR. WELLS:

Well —

10

THE COURT:

So z he problem is that it's a

11

ques tion of e xpertise.

12

mcvi ng fr om t reacment tc s ome other form of expertise.

13

I T m curious as to why you didn't elicit the question in

14

the depos ition and why you didn't notif / the purpose of

15

the opini on.

16

you say, but maybe you do.

17

At that point t ne physician is

Maybe you don't have that obligation, as

MR. WELLS:

i generally don't do that.

And all

18

I T m sayin g is that in this particular case I am

19

surprised by the motion.

20

for them to 1 ay back when they have known from the get-

21

go t hat D r. M cClean is goi rig to

22

that this is what--the day they got: his records, they

3
24
25

And I think I am prejudiced

s a y — i t 's in his records

knew that he believed that these injur!es he was
t rearing were from the ace ident.
So they lay back and wait unt il the dav before

PRUNED A v. CClUMBi;
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trial and then file this motion, when they could have
z

asked him in the deposition.

3

am surprised and ± am the one that will be preju11 ri ^ r.pri

4

They can't say they were surprised b* icause itrs right

5

there in the records.

6
7

THE COURT:

I

And let me read ycu one.
No, I ! m — i f it's there, I'll take

your word on it.

8
9

Thev are not surprised.

MR. WELLS:

Yeah, it's there.

He says in the

records, I have now completed treatment for the injuries

10

received in the auto accident.

11

his —

He says that right in

12

THE COURT:

13

not what I'm concerned about.

14

puts them on notice that his opinion is going to include

15

causation.

16
17

MR. WELLS:

But that is—you understand that's
I don't know that that

Well, what do we mean when we say

"causation"?

18

THE COURT:

What I told you earlier.

19

MR. WELLS:

Is he going to be able to say that

20

I was treating for i n — i n other words, they come m

21

the history, the first time they come in, and they say,

22

We were in this auto accident and we've got this pain

23

and this whatever, and h e —

24
25

THE COURT:
the opinion.

"Yes, m

on

It's different from a history, it's
my opinion, to a reasonable

45
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degree o f medicai certainty , these injuries were caused

2

by that accide nt."

3

It's something tuat can

MR. WELLS:

1

And I t h i n k — I think that T s

4

I implicit: when he puts in the record and says, I have now

5

finished treating them for the inju ries they received in

6

the acci dent.

7

that the injur ies were from the ace ident?

8
9

Is that not implicit , that his opinion is

THE COURT:

Well, let me hear from

Mr. Chri stense n .

10

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

First o f all, that

11

(inaudib l e ) — I didn't know we were going to be arguing

12

this tod ay, so I left my motion in limine binder behind.

13

Do you have th e d a t e — c a n you give me the date on the

14

designation of the witness, the exp ert designation?

15
16

THE COURT:

(inaudible)

look at our fi le copy.

17
18

I hav e his pi eadings

MR. CHRISTENSEN:
on

(inau dible)
Okay

19

Just hi s pleading, the date

Thank you, Your Honor.
Your Honor , I think you've got it

20

perfectl y, which is the reason a tr eating doctor does

21

not have to gi ve an opinion is beca use you get his

22

records.

23

treatmen t given.

24

testify to his treatment.

25

His records simpI y state, this is the
A treatin g doctor can ccme in and

I have no object!on to Dr

McCiean cettincr uo

i
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1

and saving, Sergio Sr. tells me he was in an auto

2

accident, gives me the following history.

3

That all comes under treatment.

4

next step and you start acting like an accident

5

reconstruction expert and saying, Oh, I've treated all

6

kinds of patients who have been in similar accidents to

7

this and it causes injury, that is expert opinion.

8

once you go to that realm, then you have to designate

9

and give those opinions.

10

That! s fine

But when you take the

There's nothing in these records that gives me

11

notice that he's going to go into that area.

12

there is a history that was taken from the patient.

13

That's not an opinion on causation.

14

And

All I see

Now, to stand here in front of the Court and to

15

say, No judge has ever—I've never seen this before,

16

Your Honor, that's ridiculous.

17

litigated all the time.

18

now, because the plaintiff's bar does not think they

19

even have to designate treating doctors as experts.

20

the defense bar says, You do.

21

This is an issue that is

It's a very hot issue right

And

And judges have uniformly come down and said

22

they can testify to treatment but if they're going to go

23

beyond their treatment and give opinions on things like

24

causation, et cetera, or give opinions on other doctors
that treated, for example, that's beyond the realm of

PRUNEDA v. COLUMBIA STEE i CASTING C(
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a report

so

that

can be covered.

To say I had the opportunity in the deposition,
I T ve

p^Q-JQ

r been given any designation that he was going

ro be tes tifying beyo nd simply his treatment.

Thank

you, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
jury

Two minutes.

We're keeping this

wait ing.
MR. WELLS:

9

Thank you, Your Honor.

I would

resp ond by sayin g right in the notes it says,

10

just

i i

"Rati ent has

12

auto

13

the r ecor ds .

reached MMI for injuries related to the

acci dent with no residuals."

14

Now,

we

They knew.

It's in

do not intend to ask him biomechanical

15

quest ions

16

him a s a biomechanica 1.

17

say.

What were you tr eating these people for?

18

will

say, I was treat ing them--they came in, I was

19

treat ing them for injuries they received

20

accic lent.

21

Have

If

I

were doing that, yes, I would

designate

All I'm asking him to do is

It's obvio us.

And he

in the

I'm not going to talk about,

(

you seen a thous and p a t i e n t s THE COURT:

22

Well, he c a n ' t — I ' m n o t — t h i s isn't

him rendering a statement that they reported these

23

about

24

injur 1 6 3

25

can r i2j •" a

came from an automobile accident.
""•*

to his hist cry.

s LOVE

,

He c a n — h e

This is his c p i n i c n —

c-mcrz

;

;
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MP. WELLS:

Well—

THE COURT:

--than these injuries were caused

by the accident.

That's different, so I don'z—I'm not

talking about history.
MR. WELLS:

Well, when he says, "Patient has

reached MMI for injuries related to the auto accident,"
what is that other than an opinion?

And it's right

there in the medical records.
And for them to say they didn't know about in
and it's a surprise and they can't be prepared for it,
their own doc—their own medical expert, m
agreed and said they were hurt m

her report,

this accident.

So I

don't know why we're having this motion.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
that.

Well, I'm going to object to

My doctor is not rendering an opinion on

causation.

My doctor is rendering her opinion that

she's looked at the records, there appears to be an
injury that was reported.

She's criticizing the

treatment that was given.
THE CCURT:

All right.

MR. WELLS:

But I asked her m

THE COURT:

Wait a minute.

MR. WELLS:

I asked her in her deposition, Co

her deposition--

Wait a minute.

you agree that they had an injury from this accidenc?
She said, Yes.

And I said, Ail you're arguing witn is

52
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how long it silould h ave taken to get better a n d — y e s .
So *:he arg ument is how long the injury from

f- ^ ^

accident took to get better, not was there an injury
4

from the accident.

5

injury.

My doctor p ut in his records that there was an

6

injury.

They are no t surprised.

7

talk to him about that fact.

THE COURT:

8
9

Their expert agrees there was an

Ail right.

I should be able to

Do you submit the

matter?

10

MR. CHRIST ENSEN:

11

MR. WELLS:

It's submi tted.

12

THE COURT:

All right.

13

Yes, Your Honor.

Thank ycu for your

arguments.
Mr . Wells, respectfull y, I disagree with you.

14
15

I believe that the opinion as to causation requires

16

notice, as I!~se

17

not permit Dr .--what ' s his name?

indicated.

The motion is granted.

I 1 11

18

MR. WELLS:

McClean.

19

THE COURT:

— M c C l e a n to speak to issues of

1 ass ume the case would stand en the

20

causation.

21

circumstance <zf

22
23

the evidence.

MR. WELLS:

Does that mean that he's not goi-ng

to be ab;*.e to r e c 2. t e—

24

THE COURT:

25

MR.

T

HZLLS :

He c a n —
— f r o m his records?

0J
c*

_ o v ii
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THE COURT:

It means that he c an refer to what

his pat ients may have claimed in terms o f their history,
but he can' t render arL opinion that in h is opinion, as a
1 physician, th ese injur ies were caused by the automobile
acciden t.

MR. WELLS:

Okay.

Is he going to be able

-L -L

1

calk to him about wherL he released them and what he said
in his record s at that time and he reads , "Patient has
reached MM I f cr injuri es related to the auto accide nt
with no resid'jais, " is that going to be a violation of
your order?

THE COURT:

I don't know that that would be a

violati o n —

MR. WELLS:

All right.

THE COURT:

— b e c a u s e they rep orted they

related to the automobile accident and h e's saying what
he t h i n k s — w h a t they told him.

MR. WELLS:

And I —

THE COURT:

If he's referencin g what they told

him, th at f s different t h a n —

MR. WELLS:

Okay.

THE COURT:

— r e n d e r i n g his op inion that as a

physici an he relates t.hem.
j

MR.. WELLS:

All right.

THE COURT:

Does that make sen Q C l ?

So I c a n — o k a y .

1

tonl

ln,
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MR. WELLS:

Yeah.

And the only—okay.

THE COURT:

If he's reporting what they

reported to him, he can do that.
MR. WELLS:

And m y —

THE COURT:

It depends on how you ask ths

MR. W^LLS:

Mv dilemma is t h a t —

auestioi

MR. CKRISTENSEN:
object to further argument.
what the ruling is.
THE COURT:

Your Honor, I'm going to
I mean, it's pretty clear

I don't think it's rocket science.
You watch your questions.

I'll

rely on his objections.
MR. WELLS:

All right.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. WELLS:

No.

THE COURT:

Are you ready to proceed?

MR. CHRTSTSNSEN:
THE COURT:

Anything else?

Yes, Your Honor.

All right.

Would you escort the

jury, please?
(Jury enters the room.)
THE COURT:

Please be seated.

The Court will

note for the record that the jury is present ana seated.
Both parties and counsel are likewise seated.
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen of tne jury.
Thank you for vcur attendance toaav.

We aoolocrize for

